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Introduction
1.1 Objectives and Purpose
In fixed income markets, investors face at least three categories of risk: interest rate
risk, credit risk, and liquidity risk. These components simultaneously affect the market
prices and, thus, the yields of bonds. As two bonds typically differ in more than one
dimension, their yield differences usually cannot be attributed to one of these risk
factors unambiguously. Therefore, it is a non-trivial task to disentangle the contribution
of the individual risk components.
The purpose of this dissertation is to study the impact of the various factors
on yield differences in fixed income markets. To do so, we analyze bond markets that
specifically allow us to isolate the different risk components and to gain insight into
the magnitude of the respective risk premia. In particular, we focus on liquidity premia
and analyze their variation for different times to maturity as well as over time. In the
next two chapters of this dissertation, we investigate yield spreads that are driven by
a differing liquidity only. In the subsequent chapter, we disentangle the simultaneous
effects of credit risk and liquidity.
Interest rate risk and credit risk have already been studied extensively in the
literature and are mostly incorporated into risk management systems and regulatory
frameworks. In contrast, the measurability and the magnitude of liquidity premia are
currently lively debated among practitioners such as accountants and actuaries, and
regulators. In particular, these issues are discussed with regard to the implementation
of Solvency II and the update of banking regulations (Basel III) in response to the
1
2recent financial crisis.
The identification of liquidity premia is particularly challenging as their impact
compared to the other risk factors is typically relatively small during normal market
conditions. Nevertheless, the pricing of liquidity is an important issue in fixed income
markets as liquidity is especially attractive during periods of market turmoil. In
particular, the recent financial crisis has shown that markets that operate smoothly
under normal conditions can suddenly dry up. Moreover, the magnitude of the liquidity
premium is important for investors with a long investment horizon like insurance
companies or pension funds. Since they are able to lock in their investments for a
long time period, buying relatively illiquid bonds with high liquidity premia offers an
interesting alternative.
1.2 Concepts of Liquidity
During the last decades, a vast academic literature on liquidity capturing very different
aspects has emerged. In this section, we provide a short overview of the existing
concepts and clarify the notion of liquidity we consider throughout this dissertation.
Moreover, we point out to which part of the literature we contribute specifically.
The literature generally distinguishes between funding liquidity and market
liquidity. Funding liquidity concerns the access of market participants, in particular
traders, to funding. Considering the liquidity of a firm, this concept is closely related to
solvency. Market liquidity refers to the ease of trading an asset. Hence, it is determined
by specific characteristics of an asset or a (homogenous) market as a whole. This
liquidity concept is also called asset liquidity or trading liquidity. Most studies focus
on only one of these liquidity aspects. In this dissertation, we concentrate on market
liquidity. However, it is worthwhile to note that articles such as Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009) and Fontaine and Garcia (2010) have investigated the interrelation
between funding and market liquidity. They show that the liquidity concepts are linked,
particularly during market crisis, and their interaction can be mutually reinforcing and
may lead to a liquidity spiral.
An early definition of market liquidity goes back to Keynes (1930), p. 67, who
describes an asset as more “liquid” than another, if it is “more certainly realisable
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at short notice without loss.” This definition shows the complex nature of liquidity
as he already includes two dimensions: price and time. Other dimensions of liquidity
are magnitude (related to the price dimension) and regeneration (related to the price
and time dimension). In market microstructure theory, as overviewed in O’Hara (1995)
and Madhavan (2000), these dimensions are rendered more precisely as tightness (size
of bid-ask spread), immediacy (time between order submission and settlement), depth
(trade impact), and resiliency (speed at which the trade impact dissipates). Amihud
et al. (2005) discuss sources of illiquidity that may lead to costs when buying or selling
a security. Rational Investors anticipate these costs of future purchases and sales which
thus affect current security prices to compensate investors for bearing them. As a
result, less liquid assets trade at lower prices, i.e. investors demand a price discount
which depends on the liquidity level. In addition, assuming a time-varying liquidity,
investors may also demand a compensation for their exposure to liquidity risk, i.e. the
risk that the asset has become less liquid when it is sold.
In standard no-arbitrage asset pricing theory, assets with the same cash flows
should have the same price. If assets have identical characteristics but differ with respect
to their current or future liquidity, any price difference can be attributed unambiguously
to liquidity differences. Such a clinical environment therefore allows to directly measure
liquidity premia. Empirical studies on market liquidity typically test for the existence
of a liquidity effect and, if supported, investigate its magnitude and the determinants.
In particular, they often try to relate the obtained liquidity premia to liquidity proxies
such as the bid-ask spread, the turnover, or return volume measures like the ILLIQ
measure defined by Amihud (2002). In the stock market, Amihud and Mendelson (1986)
are the first to study the impact of liquidity on asset prices and motivated ample further
studies such as Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Hasbrouck (2009) on the level
of liquidity. Recently, Chordia et al. (2000), Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003), and Acharya
and Pedersen (2005) study the pricing of liquidity risk in stock markets.
In contrast to stock markets, fixed income markets provide a much cleaner area for
investigating the effect of liquidity on asset prices. First, promised (contractual) cash
flows of straight bonds are known with certainty. Second, liquidity differences disappear
at maturity. Therefore, bonds with identical promised cash flows and identical credit
risk should trade at the same price except for a potential liquidity premium. Hence,
4yield differences between these bonds can directly be interpreted as liquidity premia
or discounts. Moreover, it is important to note that liquidity premia in fixed income
markets can also be assigned to specific times to maturity. This fact especially allows
to study the term structure of liquidity premia.
Empirical studies on liquidity in fixed income markets can further be classified
into two groups. The first one contains studies such as Houweling et al. (2005) and
Goyenko et al. (2010) that attempt to directly measure market liquidity by proxies
such as the bid-ask spread. The second group examines the effect of illiquidity on
market prices. The studies within this dissertation belong to the second category as
we analyze the effect of different liquidity in closely related markets on yield spreads.
Here, it is useful to differentiate between studies which concentrate on bonds that are
considered to be default-free, typically government bonds, and studies using defaultable
bonds like corporate bonds. This second group of studies has to control for price or
yield effects of default risk.
The studies by Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Warga (1992), Kamara (1994),
Krishnamurthy (2002), and Goldreich et al. (2005) analyze the U.S. Treasury market.
These studies, however, investigate either short times to maturity only or, to some
extent, suffer from interpolation errors in yields related to not perfectly matched cash
flows. In contrast, we are able to accurately extract a model-free term structure of
liquidity premia for up to ten years in the U.S. Treasury market and the market for
German government bonds.
For corporate bonds, Fisher (1959) is one of the first to study the determinants
of corporate bond yield spreads relative to government bonds and relates them to the
issue volume as a proxy for liquidity. Due to increased transparency in corporate bond
markets, in particular due to the availability of TRACE Corporate Bond Data, a large
number of studies such as Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Chen et al. (2007), and Dick-
Nielsen et al. (2009) investigate liquidity and credit risk premia in this market. De
Jong and Driessen (2007) and Acharya et al. (2010) particularly focus on liquidity risk
rather than the level of liquidity. These studies, however, usually need a number of
modeling assumptions to disentangle liquidity and credit risk. In contrast, we study
the Pfandbrief market that allows for an intuitive stratification of Pfandbriefe into
segments in which prices mainly differ by only one risk factor.
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1.3 Contribution and Organization
Our main contributions to the existing literature on liquidity premia in bond markets
concern the following three aspects. First, we accurately isolate model-free term
structures of liquidity premia between bonds with exactly matched-maturities in the
U.S. Treasury market as well as the German government bond market and study their
cross-sectional and time-series behavior. Second, we show that specific securities are
priced almost identically even though they considerably differ with respect to their
liquidity. Third, we investigate the Pfandbrief market and show that liquidity is the
most important, but not the exclusive risk factor explaining yield spreads. In addition
to the literature on liquidity premia in bond markets, we extend the literature on
STRIPS markets. We provide a solution for the empirical puzzle that matched-maturity
principal and coupon STRIPS trade at different prices. Furthermore, we contribute
to the literature on credit risk premia in bond markets by isolating the different
risk components within the Pfandbrief market. In contrast to previous studies, we
consider the time-variation of Pfandbrief yield spreads by investigating different market
environments and we explicitly account for the issuers’ default risk and the quality of
the cover pool.
This dissertation is organized in three self-contained chapters. A more detailed
discussion of the contribution to the relevant literature is given at the beginning of
each chapter. In the following, we give a short summary of the different approaches
and the most important findings.
In Chapter 2, we isolate model-free and maturity-dependent liquidity premia
within the U.S. Treasury market. The issuing policy of the U.S. Treasury provides us
with a clinical environment to test for liquidity effects between Treasury notes and
Treasury STRIPS. We analyze the differences between directly observed yields from
coupon and principal STRIPS and synthetic yields obtained via bootstrapping Treasury
notes. These yields reflect the liquidity of the coupon and principal STRIPS and the
liquidity of the Treasury notes, respectively. As the maturities of the observed STRIPS
yields exactly match the coupon and maturity dates of Treasury notes, we can directly
compare them and no interpolation is required. Since we control for potential effects
due to an asynchronous taxation, the differences directly measure the effect of the
6differential liquidity.
The main results of this study are as follows. First, we isolate an average liquidity
premium between coupon STRIPS and Treasury notes of up to 13.7 bp during normal
market conditions and up to 28.6 bp during the recent financial crisis. More importantly,
the term structure of liquidity premia between coupon STRIPS and Treasury notes has
a different sign for short and long maturities. This effect is surprisingly stable over time
and can be attributed to the higher liquidity of coupon STRIPS for short maturities
as measured by their outstanding amount and their stripping activity. Second, for
principal STRIPS, we find that their yields basically coincide with synthetic yields.
This result can be related to the principal STRIPS’ unique reconstitution feature.
Third, we show that principal STRIPS typically trade at a lower yield than otherwise
identical coupon STRIPS. These empirically observed yield differences can be related
to the liquidity premia between the coupon STRIPS market and the Treasury notes
market and any direct liquidity effect between the matched-maturity STRIPS is of
minor importance.
In Chapter 3, we investigate liquidity premia in the German government bond
market. The methodology to isolate the liquidity premia is similar to the approach
presented in Chapter 2. The results, however, show some striking differences on the
one hand, and important similarities on the other. In contrast to the results for the U.S.
Treasury market, German coupon STRIPS nearly always trade at a liquidity premium
compared to synthetic zero-bonds obtained via bootstrapping Bunds and the premia
do not show a clear maturity structure. However, the premia are rather small and
economically negligible. Moreover, the yield differences significantly increase during
the recent financial crisis and can to a large part be explained by liquidity related
macroeconomic variables. As for the U.S. Treasury market, we find that German
principal STRIPS trade in line with their corresponding synthetic zero-bonds even
though they are substantially less liquid. Further, we show for the German government
bond market that the positive differences between matched-maturity coupon and
principal STRIPS do not stem from their relative liquidity, but can be traced back
to the liquidity differences between the coupon STRIPS and the Bunds market.
In Chapter 4, we analyze liquidity and credit risk premia in the German
Pfandbrief market. We measure individual Pfandbrief yield spreads relative to the
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estimated term structure of interest rates of public Jumbo Pfandbriefe. Due to the
high level of standardization and the precise legal requirements, it is, in contrast to
studies in the corporate bond market, relatively easy to isolate the different components
of the individual Pfandbrief yield spreads.
Yield spreads between Pfandbriefe and German government bonds usually have
been interpreted as pure liquidity premia. Our analysis reveals that liquidity is the most
important, but not the exclusive risk factor within the Pfandbrief market. We show
that the Pfandbrief yield spreads also depend on the quality of the issuer, the type of
collateral, and the quality of the underlying assets. In particular, it is surprising that the
issuer’s default risk is priced considerably, even though Pfandbriefe are backed by high-
quality mortgages or public-sector loans and no single Pfandbrief has ever defaulted.
Using recently published cover pool data, we are also able to demonstrate that the
quality of the cover pool assets is less relevant in a normal market environment, but
important in times of financial turmoil.
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Chapter 2
The Term Structure of Liquidity
Premia in the U.S. Treasury
Market1
2.1 Introduction
Bonds are ideal financial assets to study the impact of changing liquidity on prices or
yields as liquidity differences cancel out at the maturity date. The natural hypothesis
that more liquid bonds trade at lower yields than their less liquid, but otherwise
identical counterparts, however, is difficult to test. The obvious reason is that bonds
differ in various dimensions and, therefore, their yield differences cannot be traced back
to liquidity effects unambiguously. Other effects are related to credit risk, specialness,
tax treatment, option features, maturity and the coupon rate. Even if one restricts the
analysis to a Government bond market to exclude most of the spread determinants,
differences in the bonds’ cash flow dates almost always remain. As a consequence,
interpolation techniques are applied to control for coupon and maturity effects in
liquidity studies. However, since empirically obtained yield differences are rather small,
it is unclear whether these differences are caused by interpolation errors or whether
the differences can be traced back to liquidity effects.
1This chapter is based on a working paper co-authored with Wolfgang Bu¨hler. Cf. Bu¨hler and
Vonhoff (2010).
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The purpose of this study is to carefully isolate liquidity premia within the
U.S. Treasury market. The issuing policy of the U.S. Treasury has provided a clinical
environment to test for liquidity effects between the Treasury notes and the Treasury
STRIPS market since 2002 for two reasons. First, the coupon dates of regularly issued
Treasury notes coincide and at least one Treasury note matures at every coupon date.
This ladder-type structure in the maturities of traded Treasury notes allows us to
perfectly obtain synthetic yields via bootstrapping.2 These yields reflect the liquidity
of the Treasury notes used in the bootstrapping procedure. Second, the synthetic yields
can directly be compared to the observed STRIPS yields as their maturities exactly
match the coupon and maturity dates of Treasury notes. The observed yields contain a
STRIPS-specific liquidity component which depends on calender time, time to maturity,
and whether the STRIPS corresponds to a coupon or principal payment.
It is well known that Treasury notes, bonds and STRIPS are direct obligations
of the U.S. government and, thus, are exposed to identical credit risk. They are also
exempt from both state and local taxes and do not have special contractual provisions.
Therefore, the markets for Treasury notes, bonds, and STRIPS are practically
homogenous, with three exceptions: specialness, federal taxes, and liquidity. On-the-
run Treasury notes or bonds typically are special in the sense that they experience
a relative excess demand, e.g. as collateral in the repo market. As a consequence,
they trade at relatively lower yields.3 The specialness of on-the-run bonds represents
a specific heterogeneity in the Treasury market and it is relatively easy to control for
this effect empirically. On the contrary, it is much more difficult to model and measure
the impact of taxes on bond prices. In this study, we show that neither tax clientele
nor tax timing effects have an impact on the observed yield differences. Therefore, any
remaining yield difference can be attributed to a different liquidity.
U.S. Treasury STRIPS are obtained by stripping a Treasury note or bond into the
coupon and the principal payments. Coupon STRIPS from different notes and bonds
are assigned the same CUSIP number if they have the same maturity date. Therefore,
2Throughout this dissertation, we use the term synthetic yield for the yield-to-maturities of
synthetic zero-bonds obtained via the bootstrapping of coupon Treasury securities. This yield is also
called the spot rate.
3See, e.g., Duffie (1996), pp. 494-496.
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they are not distinguishable. On the contrary, principal STRIPS of each note and bond
are unique and not interchangeable with other principal or coupon STRIPS. Hence,
there is a specific heterogeneity in the STRIPS market caused by the different treatment
of coupon and principal STRIPS. We analyze the consequences of this difference in our
empirical study.
Our clinical sample allows us to determine three term structures of interest rates
with exactly matched maturities. The first is obtained by bootstrapping Treasury notes,
the second from coupon STRIPS, and the third from principal STRIPS. Analyzing
these term structures of interest rates allows us to gain insight into maturity dependent
liquidity premia between the different markets.
Our study is related to three important strands of literature. The first identifies
liquidity premia in Treasury bills, notes and bonds. Amihud and Mendelson (1991)
and Kamara (1994) study yield differences between Treasury bills and Treasury notes
with maturities below six months. They find significant liquidity premia in the yields
of notes compared to bills. A couple of studies analyze the on-the-run phenomenon,
e.g., Warga (1992), Krishnamurthy (2002), Goldreich et al. (2005), and Pasquariello
and Vega (2009). These studies find that most recently issued government bonds have
lower holding-period returns or trade at lower yields than previously issued bonds
maturing on similar dates. They attribute this effect to a higher liquidity of the recently
issued bonds. Elton and Green (1998) compare portfolios of Treasury securities with
approximately the same cash flows but different liquidity (as proxied by trading volume)
and find that a higher liquidity leads to lower yields. Longstaff (2004) investigates price
differences between Treasury STRIPS and stripped Refcorp bonds and relates them
to flight-to-liquidity proxies. All these studies, however, suffer to some extent from
interpolation errors related to not perfectly matched cash flows or they econometrically
have to control for differences in the coupons or maturities. As the yield differences are
typically small, e.g. only up to 1.5 bp on average in the study by Goldreich et al. (2005),
it cannot be excluded that a larger part of these differences are introduced by matching
methods. This critique does not apply to the studies by Fleming (2002) and Strebulaev
(2002). In contrast to our study, however, these studies have to restrict their sample to
bills and notes with less than six months prior to maturity to obtain exactly matched
cash flows. Recently, Goyenko et al. (2010) study bond market liquidity by analyzing
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time-series of quoted bid-ask spreads for different maturities over an extended period
of time. While this study analyzes three broad maturity classes, we provide a in-depth
analysis with 20 maturity classes.
The second strand of literature deals with the impact of taxation on bond prices.
One of the major problems is the existence of tax clienteles which was first studied
by Schaefer (1982) and Litzenberger and Rolfo (1984b). Using the typical approach
for estimating implied tax rates of the marginal investor, Green and Ødegaard (1997),
Elton and Green (1998), and Liu et al. (2007) find support for the absence of tax
clientele effects in the U.S. Treasury market for periods after the Tax Reform Act
of 1986. Based on buy-and-hold strategies, our results support the findings of these
authors that the marginal investor is tax-exempt and taxes do not substantially impact
government bond prices. A second problem is the existence of tax timing options.
Constantinides and Ingersoll (1984) theoretically derive the value of these options.
Empirically, Litzenberger and Rolfo (1984a), Jordan and Jordan (1991), and Elton
and Green (1998) determine their value by using bond “triplets” and find evidence for
their existence. Regarding the yield differences between Treasury STRIPS and Treasury
notes, however, we deduce that tax timing effects do not impact our results.
The third strand of literature specifically deals with Treasury STRIPS and
consists of two groups. The first group primarily focusses on arbitrage opportunities
between coupon bonds and the replicating portfolio consisting of STRIPS. Most studies,
e.g. Lim and Livingston (1995), Grinblatt and Longstaff (2000), Jordan et al. (2000),
and Sack (2000), find that arbitrage opportunities are rare and cannot be exploited
successfully once transaction costs are considered. Grinblatt and Longstaff (2000) show
that observed price differences between the portfolios can partially be explained by
liquidity-related factors. Contrary to our study, these studies analyze price differences
only on a portfolio basis and, therefore, do not allow the isolation of liquidity effects in
the term structure of interest rates. The second group of studies investigates observed
price and yield differences between matched-maturity coupon and principal STRIPS.4
Daves and Ehrhardt (1993) find that principal STRIPS typically trade at a lower
4Other studies of U.S. Treasury STRIPS examine motives for stripping and rebundling (Grinblatt
and Longstaff (2000)), term structure estimation (Sack (2000)), and cointegration (Kung and
Carverhill (2005)).
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yield than otherwise identical coupon STRIPS. They attribute the difference to a
reconstitution option embedded in principal STRIPS and to liquidity differences.
Jordan et al. (2000) obtain a similar result. They observe, however, that principal
STRIPS sometimes trade at lower yields and attribute these yield differences to the
richness of the underlying note or bond. We contribute to this strand of literature
by showing that these differences can be ascribed to the liquidity differences between
coupon STRIPS and the Treasury note corresponding to the principal STRIPS.
The main results of our study are the following. First, we find that coupon
STRIPS yields significantly differ from synthetic yields obtained via bootstrapping
Treasury notes. We provide evidence that these differences cannot be explained by
tax clientele or tax timing effects. Thus, we empirically isolate an average liquidity
premium of up to 14 bp during normal market conditions, and up to 29 bp during
the recent financial crisis. More importantly, the term structure of liquidity premia
between coupon STRIPS and Treasury notes has a different sign for short and for long
maturities. This effect is surprisingly stable over time and can be attributed to the
higher liquidity of coupon STRIPS for short maturities. The well-known on-the-run
effect is of minor importance. For principal STRIPS, on the contrary, we find that
their yields basically coincide with the synthetic yields. This result can be reasoned by
the principal STRIPS’ unique reconstitution feature and no distinct liquidity premium
can be isolated.
Second, we analyze the maturity structure of yield differences between different
coupon and principal STRIPS maturing on the same day. For short maturities (below
two years), we find lower yields for coupon STRIPS than for principal STRIPS. For
long maturities (7-10 years) we find higher yields. This result extends the finding of
Daves and Ehrhardt (1993) and Jordan et al. (2000) that, on average over all maturities,
coupon STRIPS trade at higher yields than otherwise identical principal STRIPS. Since
matched-maturity STRIPS are taxed synchronously, taxation obviously cannot explain
these differences. In this study, we show that the empirically observed yield differences
between coupon and principal STRIPS can be traced back to the liquidity premia
between coupon STRIPS and Treasury notes. Extending this approach, we show that
yield differences between different principal STRIPS maturing on the same day can
be ascribed to the fact that they differ with respect to their underlying instrument,
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either a Treasury note or a Treasury bond. Hence, the liquidity differences between
Treasury notes and bonds transmit to the STRIPS market and any direct liquidity
effect between the STRIPS is of minor importance.
Finally, our analysis shows that liquidity premia between coupon STRIPS and
Treasury notes significantly increase during the recent financial crisis. To capture
the time variation of liquidity premia, we relate the observed yield differences to
macroeconomic variables that are associated with a flight-to-liquidity. The results
suggest that short-term coupon STRIPS and long-term notes can be regarded as a
“safe haven” with regard to liquidity risk in times of higher uncertainty.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we carefully
describe the institutional details of the STRIPS program and discuss potential effects
on the yield differences. In addition, this section presents the empirical design. In
Section 2.3, we provide and discuss the empirical results. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 Design of the Study
Subsequently, we recall some well-known institutional features of the U.S. Treasury
STRIPS program as far as they are relevant for our study.5 We further render the
calculation of observed and synthetic yields more precisely. Moreover, we discuss the
potential impact of liquidity, taxation, and the unique reconstitution feature on our
results. Finally, we present the empirical design of our study.
2.2.1 Institutional Details
The Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal Securities (STRIPS)
programm was set up by the U.S. Treasury in 1985. Since October 1997 almost all
newly issued notes and bonds have been eligible for stripping. STRIPS are direct
obligations of the U.S. government and are obtained by delivering a Treasury note
or bond to the Federal Reserve in exchange for a bundle of zero-bonds corresponding
to the coupon and principal payments. As notes and bonds are held in book-entry form
5A detailed description of the Treasury STRIPS program can be found, e.g., in Grinblatt and
Longstaff (2000) and Jordan et al. (2000).
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the transaction can be executed at little cost.6
STRIPS are identified by whether they are created from a coupon or a principal
payment. Coupon STRIPS that are due on the same day are assigned the same CUSIP
number, even if they originally come from a different note or bond. Contrarily, the
principal STRIPS of each note and bond are assigned a unique CUSIP number and
they are not interchangeable with other principal or coupon STRIPS. To reconstitute
a previously stripped note or bond, the appropriate proportions of the component
STRIPS must be delivered to the Federal Reserve. For the principal payment, the
principal STRIPS must have been derived from the note or bond being reconstituted.
For the coupon payments, however, matched-maturity coupon STRIPS from arbitrary
notes or bonds can be used.
For our analysis, we first determine the observed and synthetic yields on a pre-tax
basis. According to market convention, we compute the annual (or bond-equivalent)
yield of a STRIPS by simply doubling the yield-to-maturity, calculated in units of
coupon periods, of Treasury notes and bonds (semiannual coupon payments). These
yields are determined from directly observed prices and, therefore, denoted as observed
yields in contrast to synthetic yields obtained via the bootstrapping of Treasury notes
and bonds. We adjust the difference if the maturity date falls on a weekend or a public
holiday to consider the cash flows exactly. We denote the annualized yield of a coupon
STRIPS by yC and the annualized yield of a principal STRIPS by yP .
For extracting synthetic yields we use the standard bootstrapping procedure. In
this procedure, the observed dirty price of a coupon bond is defined as the sum of
discounted future cash flows. The discount factors or, equivalently, the synthetic yields
are unknown. Given observed prices of coupon bonds with identical coupon dates, and
given that at every coupon date up to some date exactly one bond matures, we can
recursively obtain the synthetic yields. We pay regard to using the same day count
conventions and adjustments as for STRIPS.7 We denote r(T ) the final synthetic yield
of a coupon bond with maturity T . If there is more than one note or bond maturing on
the same coupon date, their final synthetic yields should be the same. However, small
6Further details are given in Sack (2000).
7As is common in the secondary market, we apply the “street” convention, i.e. we compound
interest until the next coupon date.
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yield differences are typically observed.8 We discuss the potential bias when presenting
our data.
For tax purposes, STRIPS are treated as originally issued discount (OID)
instruments and taxed according to the constant yield method. Therefore, the annually
accrued interest on STRIPS is taxed even though no interest is paid, leading to negative
cash flows for taxable entities prior to maturity. It is important to note that the after-
tax yield cannot simply be calculated from its pre-tax yield multiplied with (1 – tax
rate). This approach disregards the obligatory intermediate tax payments during the
maturity of the STRIPS. Instead, a bootstrapping-type procedure is applied to the
after-tax cash-flows.9
Considering the current U.S. tax law we are also able to calculate the synthetic
after-tax yields for Treasury notes. We assume that the investors’ tax rates do not
change over time and that they choose the optimal amortization rule, i.e. deferring
market discount amortization to maturity and amortizing market premium by the
constant yield method.10 Then, the synthetic after-tax yields can be calculated by
using the bootstrapping procedure with after-tax cash flows.11
2.2.2 Potential Effects on Observed and Synthetic Yields
(1) Liquidity
Typical proxies for the liquidity of a fixed income security include trading activity, the
outstanding amount, the bid-ask spread, and the age.12 Only the first two proxies need
a clarification for the STRIPS market and are defined as follows:
Trading activity is typically measured by the number of trades, the trading
volume, the time period between trades, or by the full order book. As none of these
variables are available for STRIPS we use the stripping activity as the best available
proxy. We define the stripping activity SAP (T ) of a principal STRIPS with maturity
T by the face value of the underlying note or bond being stripped within a given time
8See, e.g., Warga (1992), Duffie (1996), and Krishnamurthy (2002).
9The difference between these after-tax yield calculations is discussed in Daves and Ehrhardt (2008).
10We abstract from the case that the amortization of a market discount may be optimal if the
investor expects an increasing tax rate.
11For a theoretical derivation confer, e.g., to the appendix of Green and Ødegaard (1997).
12See, e.g., Fleming (2003).
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interval (one month). For coupon STRIPS with a certain maturity T , we define the
monthly stripping activity SAC(T ) by the sum of matched-maturity coupon STRIPS
being obtained via stripping notes or bonds with equal or longer maturities within a
given time interval, i.e.
SAC(T ) =
∑
s≥T
Cs
100
· SAP (s), (2.1)
where Cs is the corresponding semiannual coupon payable at T . This definition reflects
the fact that matched-maturity coupon STRIPS are interchangeable (are assigned the
same CUSIP number). As a consequence, the stripping activity of coupon STRIPS
increases if the remaining time to maturity decreases. Stripping activity is positively
related to trading volume as the incentive to strip typically comes from retail. This fact
was previously stated by Stigum (1990), p. 696, and reconfirmed by recent conversations
with traders. The STRIPS trader initiates the stripping procedure with the Federal
Reserve and sells coupon or principal STRIPS to the customers.13
The outstanding amount of a security provides information about the absolute
supply of this security. The actually outstanding amount of a specific note or bond
at a given point in time is the total outstanding volume minus the amount held in
stripped form. Analogously, the outstanding amount OAP (T ) of a specific principal
STRIPS with maturity T equals the total outstanding volume of the underlying note
or bond held in stripped form. For coupon STRIPS with a specific maturity date T , the
outstanding amount OAC(T ) equals the total coupon volume of all notes and bonds
that mature at or after this specific maturity date and are held in stripped form, i.e.
OAC(T ) =
∑
s≥T
Cs
100
·OAP (s). (2.2)
Treasury notes and bonds clearly differ from Treasury STRIPS with respect to their
outstanding amount. Shortly after an issuance of a note or bond, typically hardly any
STRIPS related to this issue exist. As pointed out above, the outstanding amount
of coupon STRIPS maturing on the same day but coming originally from different
13Reconstitution activity could also be used as a proxy for trading activity, however, as it is highly
positively correlated to stripping activity we do not consider it.
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issues add up due to the fungibility. Therefore, OAC(T ) increases with decreasing time
to maturity and it is possible that this amount exceeds the outstanding amount of
the note or bond.14 A similar relationship holds between the outstanding amounts of
coupon and principal STRIPS.15
Besides these liquidity proxies we also consider the well-known on-the-run effect.
Ample empirical studies have found that most recently issued notes trade at lower yields
and are more liquid than older ones.16 We control for this specific effect by including a
dummy variable with value one if the note trades on-the-run, and zero otherwise.
(2) Taxation
The differential federal taxation between coupon Treasury securities and Treasury
STRIPS may affect the observed and synthetic yields calculated as in Section 2.2.1.
Therefore, we analyze potential tax clientele and tax timing effects. First, we empirically
investigate whether different tax clienteles may have an impact on the yield differences
between these markets. Second, we derive that tax timing effects do not influence our
results.
Considering buy-and-hold investors, a clear-cut tax advantage or disadvantage of
one of these markets does not exist. In particular, the feedback effect between the prices
of notes or STRIPS and their taxation leads to non-linear tax effects with respect to
various factors. The direction of the tax effect in a buy-and-hold setting depends on
the maturity time, the shape of the term structure of interest rates, and whether a note
trades below or above par.17 For obtaining the direction of a potential tax effect we
now assume that investors value Treasury notes and STRIPS using identical after-tax
yields. If taxes play a role in the Treasury market, prices (and therefore pre-tax yields)
have to adjust to meet this requirement. In the following, we discuss the potential
effects for any marginal tax rate greater than zero.
Discount notes obtain a tax advantage relative to STRIPS that is increasing in
14In December 2004, e.g., the outstanding amount of the 12% Treasury Bond maturing on 15 May
2005 was USD 1,957 million whereas the outstanding amount of corresponding coupon STRIPS was
USD 3,684 million.
15Daves and Ehrhardt (1993), p. 319, provide an example of this effect.
16See, e.g., Krishnamurthy (2002), Goldreich et al. (2005), and Pasquariello and Vega (2009).
17Gregory and Livingston (1989) analyze tax differences between a note and a pre-tax cash-flow
matching portfolio of STRIPS for different tax scenarios in detail.
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its market discount. In contrast to the discount of STRIPS, the market discount of a
coupon bond trading below par does not have to be amortized until maturity. This
rule leads to a tax deferral compared to STRIPS, and the advantage will appear in a
lower final pre-tax yield required for discount bonds compared to STRIPS. Thus, we
expect the synthetic final pre-tax yield of the note to be lower the higher its discount,
leading to a higher pre-tax yield difference between Treasury STRIPS and notes.
For premium notes the result is ambiguous and the direction of the tax effect may
slightly depend, among others, on the shape of the term structure.18 The premium of
coupon bonds, however, can be amortized by applying the constant yield method. Since
STRIPS are also taxed by the constant yield method, there is virtually no difference
in the after-tax yields. Therefore, we cannot establish a general relationship, as for the
case of notes trading at a discount.
These effects are in line with the analysis of Gregory and Livingston (1989) for
the current U.S. tax law. In contrast to the findings of Kamara (1994), our setting
differs in two respects: First, Kamara (1994) analyzes maturities of less then six month
such that the taxation is identical regardless of whether one is buying a note, a bill
or STRIPS. Second, we do not consider the sellers’ point of view as their tax strategy
highly depends on the time of the purchase and whether the note was bought at a
premium or at a discount.
In contrast to this potential tax clientele effect, we do not expect tax timing
options to have an impact on the yield differences. Obviously, one could argue that a
STRIPS portfolio has more tax timing options than the corresponding Treasury note,
leading ceteris paribus to a higher value of the STRIPS portfolio. However, as tax
timing opportunities arise, the note can immediately be stripped and some STRIPS
can separately be sold in the market, possibly leading to advantageous capital gains
or losses.19 Hence, the tax timing options in the coupon Treasury market should not
differ from the tax timing options in the STRIPS market. This result is in line with
Grinblatt and Longstaff (2000) who discuss the effect of tax timing on the relative
pricing of Treasury notes and STRIPS.
18Precisely, the effect depends on the pre-tax and after-tax yields for all payment dates t < T .
19Section 1286 of the Internal Revenue Code states that the basis of the stripped Treasury note or
bond shall be allocated with respect to the fair market values to the corresponding STRIPS.
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Fortunately, for an important part of our study potential tax differences do not
matter. The yields of matched-maturity coupon and principal STRIPS are affected
identically by taxation.20 Hence, the yield differences between these STRIPS can
exclusively be traced back to liquidity differences and specific reconstitution features.
The size of these differences also allows us to control for tax effects in the differences
between observed STRIPS yields and synthetic yields obtained from Treasury notes
and bonds by the bootstrapping procedure.
(3) Reconstitution
An important effect that may lead to yield differences between coupon and principal
STRIPS is that matched-maturity coupon and principal STRIPS are not perfect
substitutes. When reconstituting a note or bond, one has to deliver exactly those
principal STRIPS originally derived from the note or bond that is being reconstituted.
Therefore, an “option to reconstitute” is implicitly embedded in principal STRIPS
and can be assumed to have a positive value.21 On the one hand, considering the
reconstitution effect only, principal STRIPS should have a lower yield than matched-
maturity coupon STRIPS. On the other hand, due to their fungibility, coupon STRIPS
may have a larger outstanding amount, especially for short maturities. Assuming that a
larger outstanding amount is related to a better liquidity and lower yields, two opposite
effects on the difference between coupon and principal STRIPS exist. It is not obvious
which effect dominates. In Section 2.3.3 we empirically investigate this problem.
Another interesting question refers to the yield differences between matched-
maturity principal STRIPS derived from Treasury notes and Treasury bonds,
respectively. Our sample allows us to measure the relative richness of the two coupon
Treasury securities in a clean way.22 It is sufficient to compare the final synthetic
yields of the respective Treasury note or bond. For example, the Treasury note is rich
compared to the Treasury bond if and only if its final synthetic yield is lower than that
20Daves and Ehrhardt (1993), p. 317, note that until the tax reform of 1989 there have been tax
advantages for Japanese investors buying principal STRIPS instead of coupon STRIPS. This benefit
was supposed by Stigum (1990), p. 695, to explain yield differences between coupon and principal
STRIPS. Nowadays, however, coupon and principal STRIPS are treated equally in terms of taxation
issues.
21See, e.g., Daves and Ehrhardt (1993), p. 325.
22Contrary to the richness and cheapness as defined by Jordan et al. (2000), our measure does not
depend on a spline-based estimation procedure.
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of the Treasury bond. Using this measure we are able to study the effect of relative
richness of Treasury securities on yields in the STRIPS market. Section 2.3.5 is devoted
to this question.
2.2.3 Empirical Design
Our sample period covers the time span from February 2002 until November 2008 on
a daily basis. This period is determined by the ability to compute synthetic yields via
bootstrapping. We divide our sample into two sub-samples. The first sample period
covers the time span prior to the financial crisis and ranges from 15 February 2002
until 29 June 2007. The second sample period starts in July 2007. We consider this
month as the first month of the financial crisis as two hedge funds managed by Bear
Stearns almost collapsed at the end of June 2007. Comparing these two periods gives
us insights whether the financial crisis has an impact on liquidity premia within the
Treasury market.
For our analysis, we need prices of coupon bonds with identical coupon dates and,
ideally, with exactly one coupon bond maturing at every coupon date. U.S. Treasury
notes and bonds are usually auctioned quarterly with semi-annual coupon payments in
February/August and May/November. The coupons and the redemptions are always
paid on the 15th of a corresponding month.23 Being issued on a regular basis, these
series are adequate to perform our study. Moreover, these series are representative for
the whole treasury market as they capture approximately 60% of the issues, and 59%
of the total outstanding volume, of all marketable Treasury notes and bonds.24
Our observation period starts in February 2002. Prior to this month, the exact
bootstrapping methodology is not applicable because no Treasury note or bond with
maturity on 15 February 2002 exists. Hence, it is the natural starting date for the
February/August series. Similarly, we start on 15 May 2003 with the May/November
series. We consider all Treasury notes and bonds from the two series for which we are
able to compute the final synthetic yields during our observation period. This restricts
23If this day coincides with a weekend or public holiday, the payment is made on the next trading
day.
24This ratio is as of December 2007 and calculated using data from the Monthly Statement of the
Public Debt of the United States.
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Figure 1: Maximum Maturity for Theoretical Yields obtained via Bootstrapping U.S. Treasury Notes.
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Figure 2.1: Maximum Maturity for Synthetic Yields of U.S. Treasury Notes
This figure shows the maximum maturity for the different series up to which we are able to exactly
determine synthetic yields via bootstrapping U.S. Treasury notes.
our sample to notes and bonds with maturities until August 2018. The maximum
maturity up to which we are able to exactly determine the synthetic yields for the
different series is depicted in Figure 2.1. From 17 February 2004 on, we are able to
determine synthetic yields up to ten years for the February/August series. For the
May/November series, however, due to a missing maturity of a note or bond on 15
May 2011 we are able to compute the synthetic yields for up to six years only.
Following these refinements, our total sample consists of 48 Treasury notes and 6
Treasury bonds of the February/August series, and 32 Treasury notes and 2 Treasury
bonds of the May/November series. These notes and bonds have fixed coupons and
do not have any embedded option. For each Treasury note and bond we consider the
corresponding principal STRIPS. We further consider all 48 coupon STRIPS maturing
at a coupon date of a note or bond in our sample. From this data we determine
three discrete term structures of interest rates for synthetic yields, coupon STRIPS
and principal STRIPS on a daily basis. In the first part of the empirical study we
further reduce our sample by considering Treasury notes only. They typically differ
from Treasury bonds by their outstanding amount, their age and potentially by an
on-the-run feature. Later, we also include Treasury bonds to measure effects of yield
differences between matched-maturity Treasury notes and bonds on their corresponding
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matched-maturity principal STRIPS.
Frequently, two or three Treasury notes mature on the same date. Thus, the
bootstrapping procedure may lead to two or three final synthetic yields for a given
maturity. We treat these yields as separate observations. However, we have to decide
the appropriate yield for discounting the coupons of notes with longer maturities. Since
the differences between the final synthetic yields of those notes are very small in our
data set, we simply take the arithmetic mean when proceeding with the bootstrapping.
As an alternative we have used the smallest and largest final synthetic yield. This
robustness check shows that the potential absolute error being introduced is 0.02 bp
on average with a maximum of 0.26 bp. Therefore, averaging does not significantly
affect our results.
We obtain daily price data for Treasury notes and bonds and coupon STRIPS via
Bloomberg over the whole observation period. For the corresponding principal STRIPS,
daily price data are available since 27 November 2006.25 The so-called Bloomberg
Generic Prices used in this study are consensus prices calculated from the information
delivered by a variety of bond dealers and financial institutions.26 Bloomberg ensures
the data quality by marking a security “not priced” if there are not at least three prices
being contributed to their system. To further verify the reliability, we checked a number
of prices with data from different sources and did not find significant differences.27
We clean our data set in the following way: we delete the observations on dates
where prices are missing for several notes such that the exact bootstrapping is not
applicable. Moreover, we eliminate the observations with zero returns for almost all
securities.28 Consistent with Amihud and Mendelson (1991) we exclude all securities
with less than 15 days to maturity. The trading close to maturity is particularly thin
and small pricing errors will convert to extreme annualized yield errors. After this data
preparation, we remain with more than 63,000 synthetic yields, about 44,000 yields of
25Therefore, we further reduce our sample by excluding the Treasury bonds maturing prior to this
date.
26Although the prices are recorded at the same time, actual transaction times may slightly differ
or the quotes may just reflect the dealers’ price evaluation. This may introduce measurement errors,
but should not asynchronously effect the yields and, thus, not bias the results systematically.
27Moreover, other data providers such as GovPX, Markit, Thomson Datastream, and Xtracter
deliver indicative end-of-day STRIPS quotes only.
28Mostly, these dates correspond to public holidays and the quotes just seem to be carried forward.
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principal STRIPS, and about 53,000 yields of coupon STRIPS. Summary information
of the data set is presented in Table 2.1.
Consistent with Bloomberg, we follow the Treasury security market convention
of next-day settlement and calculate accrued interest on an actual/actual basis. We are
aware of the market convention that price information for STRIPS are usually quoted
as (three-digit) yields. Since Bloomberg’s methodology, however, is based on consensus
prices we believe in being more accurate by taking the given prices and calculating
the corresponding yields. Moreover, by using price data we are consistent with our
methodology for calculating the synthetic yields. The absolute differences to the yields
delivered by Bloomberg are below 0.2 bp and are due to rounding differences.
We use end-of-day mid prices for calculating the synthetic yields from Treasury
notes as well as the yields of coupon and principal STRIPS. Therefore, we do not
take transaction costs into account. Nevertheless, when interpreting the results we
analyze whether the yield differences exceed the typical bid-ask spreads. We calculate
the bid and ask yields for STRIPS using bid and ask prices delivered by Bloomberg.
For assessing synthetic bid and ask yields we simply add, or subtract, half of the typical
bid-ask yield spread from, or to, synthetic yields.29
To study liquidity effects we collect monthly observations on the total outstanding
volume, the amount held in stripped form, and the stripping and reconstitution activity
of Treasury notes and bonds. This data covers our 82-month sample period from
February 2002 to November 2008 and is obtained from the Monthly Statement of the
Public Debt of the United States issued by the U.S. Treasury. Furthermore, for analyzing
the flight-to-liquidity premium, we obtain monthly observations of the federal funds
rate (FED) from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, and monthly observations
of the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX ) via the Bloomberg
system. This data also covers our sample period from February 2002 to November
2008.
29The Bloomberg methodology usually assumes a representative bid-ask spread of 1/16 in terms of
prices for notes and bonds (1/32 for maturities up to 1 year and on-the-run issues). For STRIPS they
assume a representative bid-ask spread of 0.02% or 2 bp in terms of annual yields. These values are
in line with evidence by Elton and Green (1998), Jordan et al. (2000), and Longstaff (2004).
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Figure 2.2: Coupon STRIPS Yields – Synthetic Yields (yC − r)
This figure shows the mean difference between coupon STRIPS yields and synthetic yields for each
maturity bin. For a given maturity bin, the mean is calculated over time for the period from February
2002 until June 2007. The filled (empty) rectangles represent mean yield differences that (do not)
significantly exceed the typical bid-ask spread.
2.3 Empirical Results
2.3.1 Coupon STRIPS Yields vs. Synthetic Yields
We first investigate the differences between the yields of coupon STRIPS and the
synthetic yields, yC − r. We classify them with regard to their remaining time to
maturity in half-year maturity bins. Bin T (T = 0.5, 1.0, . . . ) consists of all yield
differences for maturities in the interval [T − 0.25;T + 0.25). The yield differences for
a given maturity bin are averaged across notes and the descriptive statistics calculated
across time.30
Figure 2.2 displays the mean yield difference yC − r for each maturity bin.
Surprisingly, the differences tend to increase with time to maturity. For short
maturities, coupon STRIPS yields are on average smaller than synthetic yields with
a yield difference of up to 10 bp. This relationship reverses for maturities above five
years and the differences are the largest for the maturity bin of ten years (14 bp).
For interpreting the economic significance as already depicted in Figure 2.2, we take
30We also calculated the results by only using the exact times to maturity of 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, etc. years.
The results are qualitatively in line with the results presented here. This restriction, however, would
reduce our data set by more than 90%.
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transaction costs into account and compare the corresponding bid and ask yields. For
maturities up to 1.5 years the mean difference of yCbid − rask is significantly smaller
than zero. For maturities larger than seven years we observe that yCask is on average
significantly greater than rbid. These differences could theoretically be exploited by
buying (selling) the synthetic zero-bond and selling (buying) the coupon STRIPS.
However, we do not claim that a violation can immediately be exploited as an arbitrage
opportunity since the synthetic zero-bond cannot be traded directly. Nevertheless, these
differences cannot be explained by a typical variation within the bid-ask spread. For
maturities between two and seven years, however, the coupon STRIPS can, on average,
be considered as being priced in line with the synthetic yields when taking transaction
costs into account.
Table 2.2 shows the detailed summary statistics of the yield differences. Almost
all mean and median differences between yC and r are significantly different from
zero. The increasing maturity structure is also evident when examining the fraction of
observations greater than zero. For maturities below two years, less than 20% of all
observations are negative whereas more than 70% of all observations are positive for
maturities above seven years.
These results only provide evidence for the cross-sectional structure of the yield
differences for the whole sample period. To examine a possible time variation, Figure
2.3 presents the mean yield differences for the two, five, and eight year maturity bin
over time. It becomes evident that the yield difference for the eight year maturity bin
nearly always exceeds the other yield differences, even though it is decreasing over
time. The yield differences for maturities of approximately five years mainly fluctuate
around zero. The two year yield differences are hardly above zero. Hence, this figure
exhibits the persistence of the yield differences for the respective maturity bins over
time.
Up to this point, we only have shown the existence of significant and persistent
differences between observed coupon STRIPS yields and synthetic yields. Subsequently,
we try to explain the cross-sectional pattern of the yield differences and their variation
over time. Therefore, we relate these differences to several liquidity proxies, a proxy
for a potential tax effect, and market-wide variables. The first liquidity proxies are
the stripping activity of a coupon STRIPS, SAC , and the outstanding amount of a
28
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Figure 2.3: Coupon STRIPS Yields – Synthetic Yields (yC − r)
This figure shows the mean differences between coupon STRIPS yields and synthetic yields for the
two, five, and eight year maturity bin for the time period from May 2004 until June 2007.
coupon STRIPS, OAC . As argued in Section 2.2.2, both variables are positively related
to coupon STRIPS liquidity and we expect the yield differences to decrease with each
of these proxies. The third variable we consider is the age of a note, i.e. the time since
the note was issued. This variable reflects the fact that notes have the tendency to
become less liquid as they age whereas this relation is ambiguous for coupon STRIPS
as they come from a variety of underlying notes and bonds.31 Hence, we expect the
yield differences to be decreasing with the age of a note. Additionally, we control for
the well-known on-the-run effect by including a dummy variable. We expect the yield
differences to be significantly larger if the corresponding Treasury note is trading on-
the-run.
To consider effects due to the asynchronous taxation of Treasury notes and
STRIPS, we include the market discount in our analysis. It is measured as the amount
of discount for each note assuming a face value of USD 100, 100 − PNote, and zero
otherwise. As derived in Section 2.2.2, the yield difference yC − r should increase with
31This argument is also supported by the fact that Bloomberg’s indicative bid-ask spread for notes
relative to STRIPS is increasing as they age.
30
the market discount of a note if taxes play a role.
Yield differences between two market segments may also be influenced by the
market-wide liquidity or a flight-to-liquidity effect. To test for these effects, one ideally
relates the yield differences to fund flows into the respective segments. Due to lack
of data, we alternatively relate the yield differences to macroeconomic variables that
proxy the overall level of market liquidity. The first of these variables is the change in
the effective federal funds rate ∆FED . A positive shock to the federal funds rate signals
a monetary policy tightening and, therefore, should be positively related to a liquidity
premium. The second variable is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index
VIX . VIX is often interpreted as an “investor fear gauge.”32 Ben-Rephael et al. (2010)
and Ederington and Golubeva (2009) recently find empirical evidence that flows from
equity to bond funds are positively related to changes in VIX . Hence, an increase
in the index may signal that investors prefer to hold less risky assets. Therefore, they
migrate to the most liquid Treasury securities which leads to an increase in the liquidity
premium.
We have already shown that short-maturity coupon STRIPS persistently trade at
a yield discount relative to notes and long-term coupon STRIPS trade at a premium.
If the yield differences are driven by differing liquidity, and a flight-to-liquidity effect
exists within the Treasury market, we should expect opposite effects of the market-wide
liquidity proxies for short and long maturities. Therefore, the yield differences yC − r
should decrease for short maturities and increase for long maturities when ∆FED or
VIX increases. We test this effect by interacting the macroeconomic variables with a
dummy for maturities below two years, and a dummy for maturities above seven years,
respectively.
Stripping information is available on a monthly basis only and, therefore, we
use end-of-month observations of the yield differences in our regression analysis.
The augmented Dickey-Fuller tests shows that the null of non-stationary monthly
yield differences can be rejected on a 1% significance level. Table 2.3 shows four
regression results which differ by the inclusion of the lagged yield differences and the
macroeconomic variables.
32See, e.g., Whaley (2009).
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Table 2.3: Regression Results of Explanatory Variables for Differences between Coupon
STRIPS Yields and Synthetic Yields
This table reports the estimated coefficients and the t-statistics from the regression of
the difference between coupon STRIPS yields and synthetic yields with the same time to
maturity. The yield differences are calculated in basis points and the stripping activity
SAC as well as the outstanding amount OAC are denoted in billion USD. AGE is given in
years, DISCOUNT in USD. OTR equals one if the note is on-the-run, and zero otherwise.
∆FED (< 2.0/ > 7.0) denotes the first differences of the federal funds rate (measured
in percentage points) times a dummy variable for all maturities below two years/above
seven years. VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index measured in
basis points and interacted analogously. The t-statistic is shown below the coefficient
estimates and is computed using Newey-West HAC standard errors. *** (**,*) denotes
the significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. N is the number of monthly observations. The
sample consists of monthly observations from February 2002 to June 2007.
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 22.02*** 4.95*** 6.40*** 1.19
14.05 4.11 3.99 1.04
Stripping Activity SAC -5.59*** -1.41*** -4.75*** -1.59***
-10.42 -4.27 -10.35 -4.80
Outstanding Amount OAC -6.20*** -1.43*** -1.30** -0.16
-12.85 -3.94 -2.55 -0.44
AGE -0.51*** -0.12** -0.02 0.02
-6.23 -2.33 -0.27 0.40
OTR 2.76*** 1.16*** 1.74*** 0.99***
2.96 2.81 2.80 2.65
DISCOUNT -0.09 -0.06 -0.35*** -0.14***
-0.74 -1.08 -3.45 -2.60
∆FED (< 2.0) -14.54*** -8.19***
-5.61 -3.76
∆FED (> 7.0) 13.78*** 5.03***
4.80 3.35
VIX (< 2.0) -0.29*** -0.11***
-9.88 -5.16
VIX (> 7.0) 0.55*** 0.18***
13.88 6.50
Lag-Variable 0.74*** 0.65***
23.69 17.73
N 2,376 2,310 2,376 2,310
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.584 0.376 0.605
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In Regressions (1) and (2), the results show a significant and negative relation
between the yield differences and the liquidity proxies. A higher stripping activity
is related to a lower yield difference reflecting the increasing mean yield difference
for a larger time to maturity as reported in Table 2.2. The relation between the yield
differences and the outstanding amount of coupon STRIPS is also significantly negative.
As expected, the effect of the age of a note is always significantly negative. The results
are robust to the inclusion of the lagged yield difference. The lagged yield difference is
significantly positive for all regressions reflecting the fact that there is a high degree
of persistence in the yield differences. The differences in the liquidity proxies can,
however, to a substantial extent explain the term structure of the yield differences
between coupon STRIPS and Treasury notes.33
The yield differences are significantly larger if the corresponding Treasury note
is trading on-the-run. Compared to regressions when omitting the on-the-run dummy
(not reported), however, the results for the liquidity proxies do not change substantially
and the adjusted R2 hardly improves. Therefore, the on-the-run effect seems to be of
minor importance.
The market discount has a significant positive effect when considered as single
explanatory variable (not reported). The adjusted R2, however, shows that this variable
hardly explains any variation of the yield differences.34 We consider the market discount
as a control variable for a potential tax effect into the liquidity regression. The
coefficient, however, is not significant and the results do not substantially change.
These findings suggest that taxation does not have an impact on the observed yield
differences and the liquidity effect remains stable even though controlling for potential
tax effects.35
Regressions (3) and (4) of Table 2.3 present the coefficient estimates when
including the macroeconomic variables. For short maturities, ∆FED and VIX have
a negative impact. For long maturities the result is vice versa. This result is consistent
33An analysis of the residuals reveals that the liquidity proxies nearly entirely explain the time to
maturity effect.
34Including the lagged variable, the coefficient of the market discount is no longer significant.
35To further validate this conclusion, we also have analyzed the impact of various variables related to
the taxation of a Treasury note or STRIPS and do not find any significant impact of an asynchronous
taxation.
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with the hypothesis that a movement to the most liquid segment occurs when the
monetary policy tightens or uncertainty increases. Moreover, it is in line with the
notion that coupon STRIPS are more liquid than notes for short maturities and less
liquid for maturities above seven years.
The adjusted R2 rises substantially compared to Regression (1) when including
the macroeconomic variables. However, the coefficient estimates for the other liquidity
proxies do not change substantially. Only the effect of the note’s age is no longer
significant and the market discount has a significant negative effect that is not in line
with a potential tax effect. Moreover, the results are robust to the inclusion of the
lagged yield difference. It is important to note that the coefficient of the lag variable
in Regression (4) is smaller than in Regression (2) and the adjusted R2 rises. Hence,
the macroeconomic variables seem to capture a considerable part of the variation over
time.
In summary, our analysis provides support that the yield differences between the
market for coupon STRIPS and the market for Treasury notes are mainly driven by the
differing liquidity of the particular instruments. Furthermore, the variation of the yield
differences over time is maturity-dependent and shows a flight-to-liquidity behavior.
2.3.2 Principal STRIPS Yields vs. Synthetic Yields
In this section, we investigate the differences between the yields of principal STRIPS
and the synthetic yields, yP − r. The results are computed and illustrated in the same
manner as the results in the previous section and displayed in Figure 2.4. Compared to
Figure 2.2, it is striking that the yield differences yP − r do not show a clear maturity
dependence. The absolute difference is below 2 bp and not significant when transaction
costs are considered. Hence, taking transaction costs into account, principal STRIPS
can be regarded as being priced in line with Treasury notes. Table 2.4 shows that the
mean or the median is significantly positive or negative for particular maturity bins,
but neither shows a maturity dependence. Moreover, an inspection of the time series
provides evidence that the yield difference vary rather randomly around zero.
As in Section 2.3.1, we formally test the relationship between the obtained yield
differences and liquidity proxies. Accordingly, we use the stripping activity of a principal
34
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Figure 2.4: Principal STRIPS Yields – Synthetic Yields (yP − r)
This figure shows the mean difference between principal STRIPS yields and synthetic yields for each
maturity bin. For a given maturity bin, the mean is calculated over time for the period from February
2002 until June 2007. The filled (empty) rectangles represent mean yield differences that (do not)
significantly exceed the typical bid-ask spread.
STRIPS, SAP , its outstanding amount, OAP , and the age of the Treasury note as
explanatory variables. Further, we include an on-the-run dummy, the market discount
to control for potential tax effects as well as the macroeconomic variables presented in
Section 2.2.2. The results are presented in Table 2.5.
In contrast to the results for coupon STRIPS, we find no significant relationship
between the yield differences and the liquidity proxies. Our findings do not considerably
change when controlling for the on-the-run effect. Only the on-the-run dummy has a
significantly positive effect showing that the principal STRIPS yield is significantly
higher than the synthetic yield if the note is trading on-the-run. However, even with
this effect, the adjustedR2 is negligible. In an univariate regression the discount variable
has a significantly negative impact at the 10% level (not reported). Including the lagged
variable, however, the impact of the discount becomes insignificant. By regressing the
yield differences on both the taxation and liquidity variables, we test the possibility
that both effects cancel out each other. The results clearly neglect this conjecture as
all parameters are statistically insignificant.
The macroeconomic variables impact the short term yield differences significantly
negatively at the 10% level, but only if the lagged yield differences in not included.
The lagged yield difference is significantly positive for all regressions. The coefficient,
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Table 2.5: Regression Results of Explanatory Variables for Differences between
Principal STRIPS Yields and Synthetic Yields
This table reports the estimated coefficients and the t-statistics from the regression of
the difference between principal STRIPS yields and synthetic yields with the same time
to maturity. The yield differences are calculated in basis points and the stripping activity
SAP as well as the outstanding amount OAP are denoted in billion USD. AGE is given in
years, DISCOUNT in USD. OTR equals one if the note is on-the-run, and zero otherwise.
∆FED (< 2.0/ > 7.0) denotes the first differences of the federal funds rate (measured
in percentage points) times a dummy variable for all maturities below two years/above
seven years. VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index measured in
basis points and interacted analogously. The t-statistic is shown below the coefficient
estimates and is computed using Newey-West HAC standard errors. *** (**,*) denotes
the significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. N is the number of monthly observations. The
sample consists of monthly observations from February 2002 to June 2007.
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.96* -0.60 -0.65 -0.39
-1.82 -1.64 -1.23 -0.98
Stripping Activity SAP 1.94 1.99 1.70 1.92
0.93 0.88 0.78 0.83
Outstanding Amount OAP 0.08 0.00 0.16 0.00
0.33 0.00 0.59 0.01
AGE 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.07
1.37 1.20 1.42 1.13
OTR 4.14** 2.29** 3.87* 2.27*
1.96 2.16 1.82 1.95
DISCOUNT -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06
-0.10 0.23 0.27 0.68
∆FED (< 2.0) -6.06* -3.70
-1.76 -1.38
∆FED (> 7.0) -8.95 0.88
-1.33 0.19
VIX (< 2.0) -0.04* -0.02
-1.66 -0.81
VIX (> 7.0) -0.02 -0.08
-0.24 -1.35
Lag-Variable 0.41*** 0.40***
6.07 5.97
N 1,373 1,313 1,373 1,313
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.149 0.025 0.153
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however, is relatively small and reflects a low degree of persistence in the yield
differences. Moreover, the adjusted R2 is relatively small for all regressions. In summary,
the regression results support the findings presented in Table 2.4, and we conclude that
principal STRIPS are on average priced in line with the synthetic yields.
This result is surprising and it allows for three preliminary conclusions. First,
differences in the taxation of Treasury notes and principal STRIPS do not result
in systematic yield differences. Second, there are no systematic differences in the
liquidity premia between the principal STRIPS and the coupon Treasury market. Third,
principal STRIPS are priced in line with Treasury notes, suggesting that the unique
reconstitution feature drives the relationship. These conclusions will be tested in the
next section. There, we explicitly control for tax effects by comparing the yields of
coupon and principal STRIPS.
2.3.3 Coupon STRIPS vs. Principal STRIPS
Matched-maturity coupon and principal STRIPS provide exactly the same cash flows
at maturity. Tax differences between these two types of STRIPS do not exist and,
therefore, should have no impact on yields. Due to differing liquidity, however, they
may actually trade at different prices. Moreover, principal STRIPS are unique in terms
of their reconstitution feature. If this feature would be the only determinant for yield
differences, the coupon STRIPS should show larger yields than principal STRIPS. If
liquidity effects are the only reason for yield differences, we expect larger yields of
coupon STRIPS for long maturities and vice versa for short maturities.
Figure 2.5 displays the mean differences between the observed yields of coupon
and principal STRIPS.36 In contrast to the finding of Daves and Ehrhardt (1993) that,
in general, coupon STRIPS trade at a yield premium relative to principal STRIPS, we
find that principal STRIPS trade at a significantly higher yield for short maturities.37
This figure is directly comparable with Figure 2.2 and shows striking similarities: First,
the yield differences tend to increase with time to maturity and change their sign at a
36Detailed summary statistics are given in Table A.1 in the appendix of this chapter.
37Carverhill (1995) also found a negative price premium of principal STRIPS over coupon STRIPS
at short term to maturity.
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Figure 2.5: Coupon STRIPS Yields – Principal STRIPS Yields (yP − yC)
This figure shows the mean difference between coupon STRIPS yields and principal STRIPS yields
for each maturity bin. For a given maturity bin, the mean is calculated over time for the period from
February 2002 until June 2007. The filled (empty) rectangles represent mean yield differences that
(do not) significantly exceed the typical bid-ask spread.
maturity of approximately five years. Second, including transaction costs, for maturities
larger than seven years we observe that yCask is on average significantly greater than y
P
bid.
Since we previously have found that principal STRIPS are usually priced according to
the synthetic yields, the liquidity premia between coupon STRIPS and Treasury notes
seem to just pass through.
Similar to the previous sections, we formally test the relationship between the
observed yield differences and liquidity proxies. Since the endogenous variable is the
difference between coupon and principal STRIPS yields, we now use the difference of
the stripping activities, SAC − SAP , and the difference of the outstanding amounts,
OAC − OAP , as explanatory variables. Furthermore, we include the age of the
principal STRIPS which coincides with the age of the underlying note, as well as
the macroeconomic variables. Table 2.6 presents the four regression results which differ
by the inclusion of the macroeconomic variables and the lagged yield differences.
As expected, a significantly negative relation between the yield differences and
the difference in the stripping activity exists. The coefficient of the difference in the
outstanding amount is not significant in Regression (2). Age has a significantly negative
impact. This effect can be reasoned by the fact that principal STRIPS tend to vanish
in the investors’ portfolios similar to their underlying notes whereas there are always
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active short-maturity coupon STRIPS in the market. The macroeconomic variables
have the same impact as on the difference between coupon STRIPS and Treasury
notes, yC − r. The lagged yield difference is significantly positive for all regressions
reflecting the fact that there is a high degree of persistence in the yield differences.
In addition to these variables, we also include the yield difference yC − r as
a measure for the liquidity differences between the coupon STRIPS and the coupon
Treasury market. Thereby, we test the conjecture that, due to the unique reconstitution
feature, the liquidity differences transmit to the STRIPS market. Regressions (5)–(8)
of Table 2.6 show the significantly positive impact of the liquidity difference yC − r
on the observed yield differences between coupon and principal STRIPS. Comparing
the adjusted R2 from Regressions (2) and (4) to Regressions (5) and (7) it is striking
that the liquidity difference yC − r explains even more of the variation compared to
the lagged yield difference. This result is in line with the finding of Jordan et al. (2000)
that yield differences between matched-maturity coupon and principal STRIPS can
be explained by the richness or cheapness of the note or bond that is underlying the
principal STRIPS.
In summary, these results show that the observed yield differences between
coupon and principal STRIPS can be explained, at least partially, by the liquidity
premia between coupon STRIPS and Treasury notes. Due to the unique reconstitution
feature of principal STRIPS, the liquidity premia just pass through and affect the yield
differences between coupon and principal STRIPS. Direct liquidity differences between
coupon and principal STRIPS are of minor importance.
2.3.4 Financial Crisis
In this section, we analyze the yield differences during the period of the financial
crisis. This time period is apparently related to a change in the bond market liquidity,
whereas the institutional features of the stripping program as well as the taxation
remain unchanged. Also, U.S. Treasury securities still do not contain significant default
risk. Any observed difference to the previous sections should therefore be related to a
different liquidity premium.
Figure 2.6 presents the mean yield differences for the time periods before and after
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Figure 2.6: Coupon STRIPS Yields – Synthetic Yields (yC − r)
This figure shows the mean difference between coupon STRIPS yields and synthetic yields for each
maturity bin. For a given maturity bin, the mean is calculated over time for the periods from February
2002 until June 2007 (pre-crisis) and from July 2007 until November 2008 (financial crisis). The filled
(empty) rectangles represent mean yield differences that (do not) significantly exceed the typical
bid-ask spread.
July 2007. The results do not change qualitatively, but are more pronounced compared
to the pre-crisis period. We can still observe that yC is significantly smaller than r
for shorter maturities and vice versa for longer maturities. Considering transaction
costs we find that the coupon STRIPS ask yield yCask is significantly greater than the
synthetic bid yield rbid for maturities larger than three years already. Moreover, the yield
differences yC − r for maturities larger than two years significantly increase compared
to the pre-crisis period. This finding provides an indication that medium- and long-
term coupon STRIPS are traded with a significant liquidity premium compared to
notes during the financial crisis.38 Our calculations also show that the two sub-samples
differ with respect to the observed volatility.39 As expected, the standard deviation of
the yield differences during the financial crisis is, for each maturity bin, considerably
greater than during normal market conditions. This finding suggests that a greater
uncertainty in times of financial turbulence can also be seen in a higher variation of
the liquidity premia.
38These results are even more pronounced when investigating the subsample for the period after
the beginning of 2008.
39Detailed summary statistics are given in Table A.2 in the appendix of this chapter.
42
Table 2.7: Regression Results of Explanatory Variables for Differences between Coupon
STRIPS Yields and Synthetic Yields during the Financial Crisis
This table reports the estimated coefficients and the t-statistics from the regression of
the difference between coupon STRIPS yields and synthetic yields with the same time to
maturity. The yield differences are calculated in basis points and the stripping activity
SAC as well as the outstanding amount OAC are denoted in billion USD. AGE is given in
years, DISCOUNT in USD. OTR equals one if the note is on-the-run, and zero otherwise.
∆FED (< 2.0/ > 7.0) denotes the first differences of the federal funds rate (measured
in percentage points) times a dummy variable for all maturities below two years/above
seven years. VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index measured in
basis points and interacted analogously. The t-statistic is shown below the coefficient
estimates and is computed using Newey-West HAC standard errors. *** (**,*) denotes
the significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. N is the number of monthly observations. The
sample consists of monthly observations from June 2007 to October 2008.
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 69.60*** 25.29*** 34.67*** 7.82*
12.79 4.90 5.33 1.66
Stripping Activity SAC -17.20*** -9.39*** -17.28*** -5.19***
-5.92 -3.82 -7.20 -2.61
Outstanding Amount OAC -18.63*** -5.85*** -5.50*** -1.17
-11.19 -4.28 -2.79 -0.89
AGE -0.24 0.16 0.38 0.36
-0.71 0.68 1.13 1.53
OTR 14.75*** 5.28 7.94** 2.39
3.60 1.53 2.31 0.90
DISCOUNT 0.50 0.50 -1.02 -0.33
0.45 0.70 -1.25 -0.54
∆FED (< 2.0) -3.99 -22.69***
-0.72 -4.13
∆FED (> 7.0) 16.50*** 8.00***
5.07 2.68
VIX (< 2.0) -0.51*** -0.34***
-5.30 -4.47
VIX (> 7.0) 0.65*** 0.31***
6.30 3.21
Lag-Variable 0.88*** 0.91***
15.03 16.19
N 655 652 655 652
Adjusted R2 0.222 0.579 0.355 0.625
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In such periods, flights-to-quality and flights-to-liquidity are widely observed,
i.e. investors prefer to have less exposure to credit risk and to hold more liquid
securities.40 Hence, we expect to observe stronger effects when performing regressions
analogously to the pre-crisis period (Section 2.3.1). Table 2.7 presents the regression
results for the period of the financial crisis. The coefficient estimates are in line with our
expectations whenever significant. The stripping activity and the outstanding amount
have a negative impact that is much stronger during the period of the financial crisis.
The on-the-run effect is significantly positive and greater than in the pre-crisis period.
Moreover, the macroeconomic variables ∆FED and VIX also have the expected signs
and a stronger impact compared to the pre-crisis period. Therefore, our results are
consistent and even more pronounced during the period of financial turmoil.
In contrast to the results for coupon STRIPS, the absolute size of the differences
between principal STRIPS and Treasury notes approximately stays the same during
the financial crisis.41 Again, considering transaction costs, the differences are not
significant. For the observed yield difference between coupon STRIPS and principal
STRIPS, we again find the striking similarity to the differences between yC and the
synthetic yield r. Hence, also during the financial crisis, the differences between coupon
and principal STRIPS are essentially driven by the liquidity premia between coupon
STRIPS and Treasury notes.
2.3.5 Notes vs. Bonds
So far we have analyzed yield differences using only Treasury notes and their
corresponding STRIPS. Jordan et al. (2000) have shown that matched-maturity
principal STRIPS coming from different underlying notes and bonds may trade at
different prices even if they provide exactly the same cash flows at maturity. We now
investigate these yield differences and relate them to differences in the final synthetic
yields of the corresponding Treasury notes and bonds. The latter differences are due
to characteristics such as a differing outstanding amount or the on-the-run feature and
should, due to the unique reconstitution feature, translate into yield differences of the
40See, e.g., Beber et al. (2009).
41The results for the financial crisis are depicted in the appendix of this chapter.
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corresponding principal STRIPS.
For lack of traded short-maturity Treasury bonds, we are not able to apply the
exact bootstrapping procedure with Treasury bonds only. Therefore, we compute their
final synthetic yields by discounting their coupon payments using the synthetic yields
obtained by bootstrapping Treasury notes. The payments, however, occur at exactly
the same dates so that we do not have any time distortion. Using this procedure, we
are able to measure the relative richness or cheapness of a Treasury bond compared to
Treasury notes accurately.
The notes examined in this section have an initial time to maturity of ten years
and the bonds have an initial time to maturity of 30 years.42 Our data allows us
to analyze four matched-maturity notes and bonds and their corresponding principal
STRIPS on a daily basis starting on 27 November 2006. Panel A of Table 2.8 shows
that synthetic yields of bonds are significantly larger than synthetic yields of notes. In
fact, the difference is positive for almost all observations. Surprisingly, the same finding
can be observed when comparing the corresponding principal STRIPS. Furthermore,
the average difference is similar for matched-maturity synthetic yields and for principal
STRIPS yields and amounts to about 10 bp for maturities in 2015 and 2016 and to
more than 20 bp for the maturity in 2017.
For the synthetic yields we observe the typical on-the-run phenomenon. The
positive yield differences can be reasoned by the fact that notes are traded more
actively than clearly off-the-run bonds which have already existed for approximately 20
years. Therefore, these differences reflect a liquidity yield premium for the aged bonds.
Regarding the different magnitude of the yield differences one should consider that the
notes maturing in 2015 and 2016 are not the most recently issued during our observation
period, whereas the note maturing in 2017 is trading on-the-run for a sizable fraction of
our observation period. Thus, the different magnitude can be explained by a liquidity
yield discount for recently issued notes.
Next, we focus on explaining the yield differences between the matched-maturity
principal STRIPS corresponding to notes and bonds, respectively. There are two effects
that should affect the yield differences in opposite directions. First, the principal
42See Panel B of Table 2.1 for details on the bonds considered.
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STRIPS have differing liquidity in terms of stripping activity and outstanding amount.
There is a huge amount of bonds held in stripped form and the notes are rarely stripped
since they are recently issued.43 Moreover, there is reasonable stripping activity for
the bonds and only sparse stripping activity for the notes. This observation suggests a
higher trading activity for the principal STRIPS of bonds compared to notes. Therefore,
the liquidity effect should lead to a negative yield difference between principal STRIPS
of bonds and principal STRIPS of notes.
Second, having the required amount of coupon STRIPS, the principal STRIPS
of notes and bonds allow the owner to reconstitute a note or a bond, respectively.
Hence, a specific principal STRIPS is unambiguously connected to the underlying note
or bond. If the underlying bond is trading at a premium compared to a note, the
principal STRIPS of a bond should also trade at a premium compared to a principal
STRIPS of a note. Thus, the reconstitution effect should result in the concordance of
the yield differences between the principal STRIPS and the yield differences between
the underlying notes and bonds.
Our results in Panel A of Table 2.8 clearly indicate that the second effect is
prevalent. We formally test this result by regressing the yield differences between the
principal STRIPS on the yield differences between the synthetic yields. The regression
results are shown in Panel B of Table 2.8. As already suggested by interpreting the
summary statistics of the yield differences, we find a positive and highly significant
relation between the observed yield differences yP,bond − yP,note and the synthetic yield
differences rbond− rnote for all pairs of notes and bonds. The estimated slope coefficient
is between 0.74 and 0.89 and the adjusted R2 is above 82%. This finding suggests that
the empirically observed yield differences between matched-maturity principal STRIPS
can, to a large extent, be explained by the differences of the corresponding synthetic
yields. Any direct liquidity effect between the different principal STRIPS is of minor
importance.
43The percentage held in stripped form of the four bonds is on average 16% and the maximum is
at 36%.
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Table 2.8: Summary Statistics and Regression Results for Yield Differences between
Matched-Maturity Principal STRIPS
PANEL A: Yield Differences between Principal STRIPS and Yield
Differences between Synthetic Yields (Same Maturity)
This table shows the summary statistics for the differences between principal STRIPS
yields from matched-maturity notes and bonds as well as the differences between the
corresponding synthetic yields. The notes have an initial time to maturity of ten years
whereas the bonds have an initial time to maturity of 30 years. *** (**,*) denotes the
significance at the 1% (5%, 10%) level. The significance of the mean is tested using a
two-sided t-test with Newey-West HAC standard errors, the significance of the median
is assessed by a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. N is the number of daily
observations. The sample consists of daily observations from November 2006 to November
2008.
Yields Bonds – Yields Notes (in basis points) Sample: 11/27/06 - 11/13/08
Maturity Mean Std. Dev. Min. Median Max. N % > 0
02/15/2015 PSTRIPS 11.7*** 13.5 -0.9 9.0*** 88.9 483 97.1%
synthetic 13.6*** 14.9 0.1 10.8*** 102.4 483 100.0%
08/15/2015 PSTRIPS 9.1*** 9.9 -4.5 6.1*** 69.5 476 98.9%
synthetic 10.5*** 11.6 -2.0 7.5*** 78.3 476 97.1%
02/15/2016 PSTRIPS 9.0*** 7.3 0.6 6.9*** 66.7 480 100.0%
synthetic 9.5*** 8.8 0.6 7.4*** 78.4 480 100.0%
08/15/2017 PSTRIPS 20.9*** 10.2 2.4 20.4*** 84.7 306 100.0%
synthetic 23.7*** 10.8 11.8 23.1*** 86.0 306 100.0%
PANEL B: Regression Results for Differences between Principal STRIPS
Yields on Differences between Synthetic Yields
This table reports the coefficient estimates and the t-statistics from the regression of
the yield difference between matched-maturity principal STRIPS on the corresponding
difference between synthetic yields. The specific model is:
yP,bondt (T )− yP,notet (T ) = β0 + β1 · (rbondt (T )− rnotet (T )) + εt(T )
The yield differences are calculated in basis points. The t-statistic is computed using
Newey-West HAC standard errors. *** (**,*) denotes the significance at the 1%
(5%, 10%) level. N is the number of daily observations. The sample consists of daily
observations from November 2006 to November 2008.
Sample: 11/27/06 - 11/13/08
Maturity β0 t-stat β1 t-stat N Adj. R2
02/15/2015 -0.3723 -1.98** 0.8875 60.55*** 483 0.958
08/15/2015 0.6007 3.60*** 0.8048 41.25*** 476 0.902
02/15/2016 1.9519 7.58*** 0.7485 28.14*** 480 0.823
08/15/2017 0.4024 0.62 0.8649 31.59*** 306 0.833
Pooled 0.5605 3.52*** 0.8438 66.07*** 1,745 0.916
The Term Structure of Liquidity Premia in the U.S. Treasury Market 47
2.4 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we investigate matched-maturity yield differences in the U.S. Treasury
market. We find significant differences by comparing the yields of coupon STRIPS with
synthetic yields obtained from Treasury notes via bootstrapping. For longer maturities,
coupon STRIPS trade at higher yields and for short maturities, Treasury notes trade
at a premium. These differences cannot be explained by a differential taxation. We
rationalize that the observed yield differences can be attributed to a different liquidity
that is changing with respect to time to maturity due to the fungibility of coupon
STRIPS. Moreover, the liquidity premium is increasing during the financial turmoil
of 2007/2008. This premium can be related to macroeconomic variables that proxy a
flight-to-liquidity effect.
The results show that the fungibility of coupon STRIPS was successful to create a
rather liquid market for Treasury zero-bonds, primarily for maturities up to three years.
In particular, this finding has been proven during the recent financial crisis. Therefore,
we can conclude that short-term coupon STRIPS can be regarded as a “safe haven”
with regard to credit and liquidity risk.
Even though principal STRIPS and Treasury notes clearly differ with respect to
their liquidity, we cannot isolate a distinct liquidity premium between these markets.
Our findings rather suggest that the uniqueness of principal STRIPS with regard
to reconstitution leads the investors to price principal STRIPS in line with their
corresponding Treasury notes.
We gain new insights in explaining the empirically observed yield differences
between coupon and principal STRIPS as well as between principal STRIPS having
the same maturity. In contrast to previous studies, our findings have made discernible
that the yield differences between matched-maturity coupon and principal STRIPS
can be traced back to the liquidity differences between coupon STRIPS and Treasury
notes. Comparing matched-maturity principal STRIPS, the yield differences can be
ascribed to the synthetic yield differences of the corresponding notes and bonds. Hence,
the liquidity differences within the STRIPS market are of minor importance and, due
to the unique reconstitution feature, any yield difference between matched-maturity
STRIPS is directly affected by the corresponding synthetic yield difference.
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These results are important for academics and market practitioners when
considering STRIPS instead of coupon bonds in empirical studies. Sack (2000) and
Steeley (2008), for example, advise to use STRIPS data for estimating zero-coupon
yield curves. However, one has to decide whether to use coupon or principal STRIPS
for such empirical studies. Our findings directly imply that, due to their unique
link via reconstitution, principal STRIPS are the superior choice when measuring
effects compared to other coupon bonds. Due to their fungibility, coupon STRIPS
do not contain idiosyncratic effects of coupon bonds and are the appropriate choice
for comparison with other zero-bonds. Certainly, in any empirical investigation with
STRIPS one should always consider possible distortions due to the liquidity effects
shown in this study.
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A Appendix to Chapter 2
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Figure A.1: Principal STRIPS Yields – Synthetic Yields (yP − r)
This figure shows the mean difference between principal STRIPS yields and synthetic yields for each
maturity bin. For a given maturity bin, the mean is calculated over time for the periods from February
2002 until June 2007 (pre-crisis) and from July 2007 until November 2008 (financial crisis). The empty
rectangles represent mean yield differences that do not significantly exceed the typical bid-ask spread.
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Figure A.2: Coupon STRIPS Yields – Principal STRIPS Yields (yC − yP )
This figure shows the mean difference between coupon STRIPS yields and principal STRIPS yields
for each maturity bin. For a given maturity bin, the mean is calculated over time for the periods from
February 2002 until June 2007 (pre-crisis) and from July 2007 until November 2008 (financial crisis).
The filled (empty) rectangles represent mean yield differences that (do not) significantly exceed the
typical bid-ask spread.
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Chapter 3
Liquidity Premia in the Market for
German Bunds and STRIPS
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we investigate yield differences between U.S. Treasury STRIPS
and synthetic zero-bonds obtained from bootstrapping U.S. Treasury notes. In the
following, we perform this approach with data for German government securities. As in
the U.S. Treasury market, the ideal maturity structure of German government bonds
(Bunds) allows us to isolate yields of synthetic zero-bonds and to compare them to
traded yields of their corresponding STRIPS. Even though the formalities for stripping
and reconstitution are similar in Germany and the United States, we find substantially
different results.
The German STRIPS program has been developed to adapt the German
government debt management to international standards and, thus, to enhance the
attractiveness of Bunds in the background of the start of the European monetary
union. Therefore, the German STRIPS program is very similar to the STRIPS program
of the U.S. Treasury and to other countries that already had introduced the facility
to strip government bonds. In contrast to the United States, however, the STRIPS
program differs in three important aspects. First, the minimum nominal amount for
stripping a Bund is EUR 50,000 compared to only USD 100 in the U.S. Treasury
market. Second, only banks are allowed to reconstitute a previously stripped Bund.
Third, private investors may have a tax driven incentive to invest in STRIPS as taxes
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are deferred until STRIPS are sold or redeemed. In this chapter, we analyze whether
these differences lead to different results in the German Bunds and STRIPS market
compared to the U.S. Treasury market. We apply the same methods as in the previous
chapter such that the results are directly comparable.
Besides these institutional details, the study for the German market further differs
in two aspects. First, except for two maturities, there is only one Bund maturing
at every coupon date. Hence, we do not have to average final synthetic yields when
continuing with the bootstrapping. As in the U.S. Treasury market often two or three
Treasury notes mature on the same day, German data provides a much cleaner sample.
Second, the amount held in stripped form is much lower in Germany compared to
the United States. Whereas the outstanding STRIPS amount may even exceed the
outstanding amount of a corresponding Treasury note, the percentage held in stripped
form in Germany never exceeds 3.6% during our sample period. As we expect observed
and synthetic yields to contain the liquidity of the respective market, this effect should
also impact the observed yield differences.
The main results of our study are the following. First, in contrast to the results for
the U.S. Treasury market, coupon STRIPS nearly always trade at a liquidity premium
compared to Bunds and the premia do not show a clear maturity structure. However,
the premia are rather small and economically negligible. Second, these yield differences
significantly increase during the recent financial crisis and can be partly explained
by liquidity related macroeconomic variables. Third, we find that principal STRIPS
trade in line with synthetic zero-bonds obtained by bootstrapping Bunds even though
principal STRIPS are substantially less liquid. Fourth, in line with the results for the
U.S. Treasury market, we show that the positive differences between matched-maturity
coupon and principal STRIPS do not stem from their different relative liquidity, but
can be traced back to the liquidity premia between coupon STRIPS and Bunds.
Our study is related to several important strands of literature. First, we contribute
to the extensive literate on liquidity premia and taxation in government bond markets
as already presented in Section 2.1. Second, we particularly complement the literature
on liquidity premia in the German government bond market. Third, we gain new
insights into yield differences between coupon and principal STRIPS in Europe and
the United States.
Liquidity Premia in the Market for German Bunds and STRIPS 57
The German government bond market usually serves as the risk-free benchmark
for European Government securities. Most studies investigating sovereign risk premia
in Europe, such as Codogno et al. (2003), Geyer et al. (2004), and Bernoth et al.
(2004), calculate yield spreads relative to German Bunds. However, only few studies
investigate liquidity premia within the German government bond market. Kempf and
Uhrig-Homburg (2000) find that German government bonds with lower liquidity trade
at a significant liquidity yield premium that increases with time to maturity. Their
sample, however, is only broadly classified into either liquid or illiquid bonds. Kempf
et al. (2010) and Koziol and Sauerbier (2007) investigate maturity-dependent yield
spreads between German government bonds and Pfandbriefe and argue that these two
markets only differ with respect to their liquidity. However, Pfandbriefe are issued
by banks and may trade at a significant default risk premium.1 In contrast to these
studies, German STRIPS and Bunds have exactly the same default risk as they are
direct obligations of the German government. Therefore, these instruments only differ
with respect to their liquidity and taxation and we are able to isolate these premia.
Moreover, we contribute to this strand of literature by investigating the full term
structure of liquidity premia of up to ten years.
In contrast to a large number of studies on U.S. Treasury STRIPS that are
presented in Section 2.1, studies investigating the European STRIPS markets are
scarce. To our knowledge, Huij et al. (2010) is the only empirical study on European
coupon and principal STRIPS.2 They investigate price differences between matched-
maturity STRIPS for France, Germany, Spain, and Italy and find that potential
switching profits are economically small. In addition to this study, we provide an
explanation that yield differences between coupon and principal STRIPS are mainly
driven by the liquidity between coupon STRIPS and the Bunds market.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we carefully
describe the institutional details of the German STRIPS program and discuss potential
effects on the yield differences. Further, we present the empirical design. In Section 3.3,
we provide and discuss the empirical results. Section 3.4 concludes.
1A detailed analysis of the Pfandbrief market is conducted in Chapter 4.
2Several studies like Kaserer (1998) and Vogt (1998) only describe the German STRIPS program
and discuss potential taxation effects.
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3.2 Design of the Study
Subsequently, we recall the most important institutional features of the German
STRIPS program as far as they are relevant for our study.3 In particular, we point out
the main differences of the German STRIPS program compared to the United States.
We further describe the calculation of observed and synthetic yields. Moreover, we
discuss the potential impact of liquidity proxies, taxation, and the unique reconstitution
feature on our results. Finally, we present the empirical design of our study.
3.2.1 Institutional Details
In July 1997, the German Federal Ministry of Finance has introduced the facility
to strip all newly issued Bunds into their coupon and principal payments. These
coupon and principal STRIPS are direct obligations of the German government and
the stripping is executed by Clearstream International or the German Finance Agency.
The minimum nominal amount for the stripping or the reconstitution of a Bund is EUR
50,000. Theoretically, the complete outstanding amount of a Bund can be stripped.
As in the U.S. Treasury market, German STRIPS are identified by whether they
are created from a coupon or a principal payment. Coupon STRIPS that are due on the
same day are assigned the same individual security identification number (ISIN), even
if they originally come from a different Bund. Contrarily, the principal STRIPS of each
Bund are assigned a unique ISIN and they are not interchangeable with other principal
or coupon STRIPS. Although every investor is allowed to strip a Bund, only banks
are allowed to reconstitute a previously stripped Bund. Due to tax reasons, banks
can conduct this transaction only for their own holdings. Thereby, the appropriate
proportions of the STRIPS components must be delivered to Clearstream International
who executes the reconstitution. It is important to note that the principal STRIPS must
have been originally derived from the Bund being reconstituted. This condition is in the
interest of a correct disclosure of government debt. For the coupon payments, however,
matched-maturity coupon STRIPS stripped from arbitrary Bunds can be used.
3A detailed description of the German STRIPS program can be found, e.g., in Deutsche Bundesbank
(1997).
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Trading in STRIPS primarily takes place over-the-counter between institutional
investors and the Federal Government has decided to list German STRIPS only at
Frankfurt stock exchange.4 Moreover, the Bundesbank does not conduct any price
management for STRIPS. In contrast to coupon and principal STRIPS, trading in
Bunds is much more widespread, already indicating that STRIPS may be perceived as
less liquid.
For tax purposes, STRIPS are treated differently for institutional and private
investors until 2008.5 STRIPS held by institutional investors are taxed similar to
originally issued discount instruments in the United States according to the constant
yield method. For private investors, the taxation of STRIPS substantially differs from
the taxation in the United States and depends on whether the investor has originally
stripped the corresponding Bund (“first buyer”) or whether he has purchased coupon or
principal STRIPS that had already been stripped.6 In the former case, coupon STRIPS
are fully taxed as interest income at the date of their sale or redemption. Contrarily,
principal STRIPS are not taxed at all and a potential loss may not be deducted from
other income as a capital loss. Hence, the taxation of the STRIPS portfolio for the first
buyer equals the taxation of the Bund only if all STRIPS are held until maturity. In
the case of a sale prior to maturity, a sizable tax drawback compared to holding the
Bund or even a capital loss due to taxation may occur.
When a private investor buys coupon or principal STRIPS that have already been
stripped, the tax method does not distinguish between the different kind of STRIPS.
The taxable income is simply the difference between the sale or redemption proceeds
and the purchase price.7 In contrast to the United States, German STRIPS are taxed
at the realization of a gain or a loss, avoiding negative cash flows prior to maturity. This
method leads to a tax deferral and, compared to the taxation of Bunds, the investment
into the corresponding STRIPS bundle may be advantageous for private investors.8
4Since March 2010, German STRIPS have also been listed at Berlin Stock Exchange.
5The taxation of interest and capital gains in Germany changed to a flat rate tax on 1 January
2009. Since our sample period ends in 2008, we only describe the previous tax system that is relevant
for our study.
6See, e.g., Kaserer (1998) and Deutsche Finanzagentur (2006) for a detailed description of the
taxation of STRIPS for private investors in Germany.
7This method is called “method of difference” or “market yield method”. Since STRIPS are not
originally issued as zero-bonds, the “issue yield method” cannot be applied.
8van Aubel and Riddermann (1998) illustrate this tax effect in detail.
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For our empirical study, we determine the observed and synthetic yields similar
to the approach in the previous chapter. In contrast to U.S. Treasury notes and bonds,
Bunds have annual coupon payments. Therefore, we simply compute the (annual) yield-
to-maturity from directly observed STRIPS. These yields are referred to as observed
yields and denoted by yC for coupon STRIPS and yP for principal STRIPS. The
synthetic yields are denoted by r and calculated applying the standard bootstrapping
procedure to Bunds.
3.2.2 Potential Effects on Observed and Synthetic Yields
(1) Liquidity
Coupon STRIPS, principal STRIPS and Bunds clearly differ in terms of their liquidity.
German Bunds are usually traded very actively and the major part of all German
government securities is traded in 10 year and 30 year Bunds (56%).9 On the other
hand, German STRIPS do not even occur in the trading statistics of the German
Finance Agency. Besides the over-the-counter market, they are only traded at Frankfurt
stock exchange with little turnover. Therefore, we expect STRIPS to generally trade
at a liquidity yield premium compared to Bunds.
To investigate the liquidity differences in more detail, we proxy the liquidity of
principal and coupon STRIPS by their outstanding amount. The outstanding amount
OAP of a specific principal STRIPS equals the amount of the underlying Bund held
in stripped form. Since stripping and reconstitution occurs frequently, it is important
to note that OAP varies not only in the cross-section of Bunds, but also over time.
Due to their fungibility, the outstanding amount of a coupon STRIPS, OAC , equals
the total coupon volume of all Bunds of the same series that mature at or after the
specific coupon STRIPS’ maturity, and that are held in stripped form. Hence, at a
fixed calendar date, OAC increases with decreasing time to maturity.
In contrast to the United States, only a small fraction of Bunds is held in stripped
form. During our sample period, the maximum fraction of a Bund’s outstanding volume
held in stripped form is only 3.6% for a 10 year Bund. 30 year Bunds, however, are
9This figure is based on secondary market data transmitted to the German Finance Agency by the
“Bund Issues Auction Group” on their secondary market activities in 2009.
Liquidity Premia in the Market for German Bunds and STRIPS 61
stripped more actively. For example, the two Bunds with maturities in July 2027 and in
January 2030 are stripped by approximately 20%. Since the coupon STRIPS obtained
by stripping these Bunds are subsumed under one ISIN, their outstanding amounts
exceed the outstanding amounts of matched-maturity principal STRIPS corresponding
to 10 year Bunds in more than 91% of all monthly observations.
We consider the following determinants of a Bund’s liquidity: total issue volume,
age, and whether the Bund is trading on-the-run or not. The total issue volume
measures the absolute supply of a Bund. The age of a Bund should be negatively
related to its liquidity since a major part of the issue volume vanishes in the portfolios
of investors and is held until maturity. For coupon STRIPS, this relation is ambiguous
as they come from a variety of underlying Bunds. Moreover, ample empirical studies
have found that most recently issued bonds trade more liquid and, thus, at lower yields
than older ones.10 We control for this specific effect by including a dummy variable
with value one if the Bund trades on-the-run, and zero otherwise.
Furthermore, we capture the liquidation risk for investors by the economic outlook
and potential trading needs by the financial market volatility similar to Kempf et al.
(2010). As in their paper, we measure the economic outlook by the Ifo business climate
index IFO and the financial market volatility by the volatility index VDAX -NEW of
Deutsche Bo¨rse Group. A positive shock to IFO is considered to be related to a lower
need for liquidity. Therefore, we expect any liquidity premia to be negatively related
to ∆IFO . In contrast, an increase in VDAX -NEW is assumed to be associated with a
higher uncertainty in the market that leads to a flight-to-liquidity behavior and, thus,
to higher liquidity premia.11
(2) Taxation
In the previous section we already have pointed out that STRIPS and Bunds are taxed
differently for private and institutional investors. From a pure tax perspective, it is not
optimal for a private investor to strip a Bund by oneself, but to buy the corresponding
bundle of STRIPS directly on the secondary market. In comparison to buying a Bund,
10See, e.g., Krishnamurthy (2002), Goldreich et al. (2005), and Pasquariello and Vega (2009).
11For the United States, Ben-Rephael et al. (2010) and Ederington and Golubeva (2009) recently
find empirical evidence that flows from equity to bond funds are positively related to changes in VIX .
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buying the bundle of STRIPS may be advantageous due to a tax deferral. This effect,
however, may not be advantageous for all private investors and is not existent for
institutional investors. Hence, it is questionable whether the effect can be observed in
the market prices.
The potential effect of a Bund’s market discount on the yield differences between
STRIPS and Bunds is identical for institutional and private investors.12 Institutional
investors have to pay taxes for capital gains due to a market discount in the case of a
sale above the purchase price or in the case of the redemption at maturity. Thus, they
may profit from a tax deferral. Private investors usually even do not have to pay taxes
on this kind on income. Therefore, this tax benefit should be reflected in a relatively
high Bund price or, equivalently, in a relatively low yield. Hence, if the tax effect is
priced in equilibrium, we expect the (pre-tax) synthetic yield of a Bund to be lower the
higher its market discount, leading to a higher yield difference between observed and
synthetic yields. In our empirical analysis, we consider this effect by a discount variable
that is 100− PBund if the Bund is trading at a market discount, and zero otherwise.
Similar to the analysis of the U.S. Treasury market in the previous chapter,
potential tax differences fortunately do not matter for an important part of our study.
Considering secondary market trading, the yields of matched-maturity coupon and
principal STRIPS are affected identically by taxation. Hence, the yield differences
between these STRIPS can exclusively be traced back to liquidity differences and the
specific reconstitution feature. The size of these differences also allows us to control
for tax effects in the differences between observed STRIPS yields and synthetic yields
obtained from bootstrapping Bunds.
(3) Reconstitution
Even though STRIPS and Bunds have differing liquidity and are taxed asynchronously,
an ultimate link exists between these markets. STRIPS cannot only be obtained by
stripping a Bund, but also a Bund can be reconstituted by delivering the corresponding
coupon and principal STRIPS. Hence, larger valuation differences between Bunds
and their corresponding portfolio of coupon and principal STRIPS should directly be
exploited by arbitrageurs. As financial institutions are the most active traders in the
12See, e.g., Vogt (1998) for a detailed discussion of this effect.
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German government bond market, it should not matter that only banks are allowed
to reconstitute a previously stripped Bund. In particular, as the principal payment is
the largest cash flow component and principal STRIPS are necessary to reconstitute
a specific Bund, their observed yields should rather trade in line with synthetic Bund
yields.
This unique reconstitution feature of principal STRIPS also shows that coupon
and principal STRIPS are not perfect substitutes. Principal STRIPS implicitly contain
an “option to reconstitute” a specific Bund and, thus, are necessary to perform a
potential arbitrage transaction. Following Daves and Ehrhardt (1993) that this option
has a positive value, principal STRIPS should generally trade at lower yields than
coupon STRIPS with the same maturity.
3.2.3 Empirical Design
Our sample period covers the time span from January 2004 until September 2008.
The start of this period is determined by the ability to compute synthetic yields via
bootstrapping Bunds. We divide our sample into two sub-samples. The first sample
period covers the time span prior to the financial crisis and ranges from January 2004
until June 2007. The second sample period starts in July 2007 and ends with the
collapse of Lehman in September 2008.13 Comparing these two periods allows insights
whether the financial crisis has an impact on the yield differences between German
Bunds, coupon STRIPS, and principal STRIPS.
For our analysis, we need prices of Bunds with identical coupon dates and,
ideally, with exactly one Bund maturing at every coupon date. Since 1997, German
Bunds are at least auctioned semi-annually with annual coupon payments and the
redemption payment on 4 January or 4 July.14 These Bunds have an initial maturity of
approximately 10 years, fixed coupons and they do not have embedded options. Being
issued on a regular basis, these series are adequate to perform our study. In contrast,
we do not include Bundesobligationen (BOBLs) with an initial maturity of 5 years and
13Afterwards, price data for STRIPS is often not reported or unreasonable price jumps are observed.
14If this day coincides with a weekend or public holiday, the payment is made on the next trading
day.
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Finanzierungsscha¨tze with an initial maturity of 2 years. These government securities
have different maturity dates and are not eligible for stripping. Moreover, we do not
include Bunds with a longer initial time to maturity since the exact bootstrapping
procedure for these Bunds is not applicable. However, the 10 year Bund series represent
the largest segment of German government bonds as they cover approximately 44% of
the total outstanding volume and 48% of the average daily trading volume.15 Actually,
approximately 24% of the daily trading volume in all European government bonds are
in 10 year Bunds.
For the January series, we use January 2004 as the starting date for the
bootstrapping. Prior to this month, the exact method is not applicable because no
Bund with maturity on 4 January 2004 exists.16 Similarly, we start on 4 July 2006
with bootstrapping the July series. We consider all Bunds from the two series for
which we are able to compute the final synthetic yields during or observation period.
This restricts our sample to Bunds with maturities until July 2018. For both series, we
are able to exactly determine the synthetic yields for up to ten years.
After these refinements our total sample consists of 14 Bunds of the January
series and 14 Bunds of the July series. For each Bund we consider the corresponding
principal STRIPS. The first two Bunds of the January series maturing in 2005 and 2006,
however, are not eligible for stripping. Therefore, our sample is limited to 26 principal
STRIPS. We further consider all 26 coupon STRIPS maturing at a coupon date of
a Bund in our sample.17 From these data we determine one discrete term structures
of interest rates for synthetic Bunds, one for coupon STRIPS, and one for principal
STRIPS on a daily basis.
We use end-of-day mid prices for calculating the synthetic yields from Bunds as
well as the mid prices of coupon and principal STRIPS via Bloomberg.18 Bloomberg
prices are quoted on a three-day settlement basis, and we compute accrued interest on
15These numbers are calculated for 2009 using data from the German Finance Agency.
16Actually, the following Bunds of this series mature on 3 January 2005 and 5 January 2006. We
account for the tiny difference of one day when computing the synthetic yields.
17The number of Bunds exceeds the number of coupon STRIPS since in 2008 and 2009 two different
Bunds of the July series mature on the same day. For these Bunds, we take the arithmetic mean of
their final synthetic yields when proceeding with the bootstrapping.
18Thereby, we do not take transaction costs into account. Nevertheless, when interpreting the results,
we analyze whether the yield differences exceed the typical bid-ask spreads.
Liquidity Premia in the Market for German Bunds and STRIPS 65
an actual/actual basis. STRIPS are usually traded over-the-counter and their trading
at Frankfurt stock exchange is rather thin. Therefore, Bloomberg is a more reliable
source since prices are provided by at least five contributors. The prices are generated
by truncating the extremes and averaging the remaining quotes.19 To further verify
their reliability, we check a number of prices with data from Frankfurt stock exchange
and DZ Bank and do not find substantial differences.
We delete the observations on dates where prices are missing for at least one
Bund such that the exact bootstrapping is not applicable. Moreover, we eliminate
observations with zero returns and exclude all securities with less than three months to
maturity. The trading close to maturity is particularly thin and small price differences
will convert to extreme annualized yield differences. After this data preparation, our
sample consist of more than 18,800 synthetic yields, about 17,400 yields of principal
STRIPS, and about 19,800 yields of coupon STRIPS. Summary information of the
data set is presented in Table 3.1.
To study liquidity effects we further collect monthly observations on the total
outstanding volume of each Bund and the corresponding amount held in stripped form.
This information is collected by Clearstream International and published by Deutsche
Bundesbank. The data covers the last 15-month of our sample period from July 2007
to September 2008. Unfortunately, prior data is not available and, thus, we cannot
examine the pre-crisis period and the financial crisis separately. Moreover, in contrast
to the U.S. Treasury market, Clearstream International does not report the stripping
and reconstitution activity of Bunds.
Furthermore, for analyzing the liquidation risk and a potential flight-to-liquidity
premium, we obtain monthly observations of the Ifo business climate index (IFO) and
the volatility index (VDAX -NEW ) of Deutsche Bo¨rse Group. This data covers our full
sample period from January 2004 to September 2008 and is obtained via the Bloomberg
system.
19See, e.g., Van Landschoot (2008).
66
T
ab
le
3.1:
S
u
m
m
ary
In
form
ation
for
G
erm
an
B
u
n
d
s
an
d
S
T
R
IP
S
T
his
table
show
s
sum
m
ary
inform
ation
for
the
G
erm
an
governm
ent
securities
considered
in
our
study.T
he
totaloutstanding
volum
e
and
the
am
ount
held
in
stripped
form
are
m
onthly
averages
given
in
E
U
R
m
illion.For
B
unds
and
coupon
ST
R
IP
S
the
data
is
averaged
across
the
different
issues.
T
he
num
ber
of
daily
observations
is
the
num
ber
of
observed
or
synthetic
yields
of
all
issues
during
the
w
hole
sam
ple
period
from
January
2004
to
Septem
ber
2008.
T
he
overall
statistics
are
based
on
equal
w
eights
of
all
observations.
10
year
B
u
n
d
s
F
irst
L
ast
T
otal
#
D
aily
Series
#
Issues
M
aturity
M
aturity
O
utstanding
C
oupon
O
bservations
January
14
01/03/2005
01/04/2018
21,264.8
4.84
12,096
July
14
07/04/2007
07/04/2018
19,894.1
4.46
6,728
O
verall
28
20,527.4
4.65
18,824
P
rin
cip
al
S
T
R
IP
S
F
irst
L
ast
A
m
ount
M
onthly
O
bservations
#
D
aily
Series
#
Issues
M
aturity
M
aturity
Stripped
A
m
ount
Stripped
O
bservations
January
12
01/04/2007
01/04/2018
197.4
152
10,943
July
14
07/04/2007
07/04/2018
83.5
177
6,464
O
verall
26
136.1
329
17,407
C
ou
p
on
S
T
R
IP
S
F
irst
L
ast
A
m
ount
M
onthly
O
bservations
#
D
aily
Series
#
Issues
M
aturity
M
aturity
Stripped
A
m
ount
Stripped
O
bservations
January
14
01/04/2005
01/04/2018
331.2
152
12,289
July
12
07/04/2007
07/04/2018
248.8
150
7,492
O
verall
26
290.3
302
19,781
Liquidity Premia in the Market for German Bunds and STRIPS 67
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
d
 D
i f
f e
r e
n
c e
 (
b
p
)
0.0
0.5
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0
Y
i e
l d
 D
i f
f e
r e
n
c e
 (
b
p
)
Maturity Binsignificant not significant
significant not significant
Pre-crisis:
Financial crisis:
Figure 3.1: Coupon STRIPS Yields – Synthetic Yields (yC − r)
This figure shows the mean difference between coupon STRIPS yields and synthetic yields for each
maturity bin. For a given maturity bin, the mean is calculated over time for the period from January
2004 until June 2007 (pre-crisis) and from July 2007 until September 2008 (financial crisis). The
filled (empty) rectangles represent mean yield differences that (do not) significantly exceed the typical
bid-ask spread.
3.3 Empirical Results
3.3.1 Coupon STRIPS Yields vs. Synthetic Yields
We first investigate the differences between observed yields of coupon STRIPS and
synthetic yields, yC − r. We classify them with regard to their remaining time to
maturity in half-year maturity bins. Bin T (T = 0.5, 1.0, . . . ) consists of all yield
differences for maturities in the interval [T − 0.25;T + 0.25). The yield differences for a
given maturity bin are averaged across Bunds and the descriptive statistics calculated
across time.
Figure 3.1 shows the mean yield differences for each maturity bin for the pre-
crisis period and the period of the financial crisis. During the pre-crisis period, all
mean yield differences are greater than zero and slightly tend to increase with time to
maturity. This increase is mainly driven by longer maturities above 8.5 years. However,
all mean differences are not significant economically, as they do not significantly exceed
the typical bid-ask spread of 2 bp. Hence, in contrast to the results for the U.S.
Treasury market, the yield differences cannot be exploited theoretically by buying
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the synthetic zero-bond and selling the coupon STRIPS. During the pre-crisis period,
coupon STRIPS therefore are priced in line with Bunds.
Table 3.2 displays the detailed summary statistics results for the yield differences
during the pre-crisis period. Even though they are not significant economically, it
is important to note that all mean and median differences between yC and r are
statistically significantly greater than zero. This effect also stems from the fact that the
volatility of the yield differences is rather small. Moreover, for 92.4% of all observations
the yield difference is greater than zero, indicating that coupon STRIPS persistently
trade at a small yield premium compared to Bunds. For maturities below 1.5 years,
however, the fraction of positive observations is substantially smaller, although still
above 50%. Hence, short term coupon STRIPS seem to be rather liquid compared to
longer term ones.
The results considerably change during the period of the financial crisis. Figure
3.1 shows that except for maturity bin 2.0 all mean differences yC − r are greater
than during the pre-crisis period.20 In contrast to the pre-crisis period, however, one
cannot observe a clear maturity structure. The overall mean yield difference rises to
2 bp with economically significant yield differences in seven maturity bins.21 Hence,
coupon STRIPS are priced at a considerable yield premium during the recent financial
crisis, suggesting a flight-to-liquidity premium relative to the Bunds market.
The previous analysis does not consider any time variation in the yields
differences. In the following, we examine the evolution of selected maturity bins over
time. Figure 3.2 presents the mean yield differences for the two, five, and eight year
maturity bin. With only a few exceptions, all yield differences vary mostly between 0 bp
and 3 bp during the pre-crisis period. During the financial crisis, one clearly observes
a shift to generally higher yield differences as already noticed in Figure 3.1. Moreover,
we do not observe that the yield differences in one maturity bin are predominantly
greater than those in one of the others. In contrast, each of the three maturity bins
shows the highest yield differences during some periods and the lowest yield differences
20Detailed summary statistics are given in Table B.1 in the appendix of this chapter.
21Our calculations assume a typical bid-ask spread of 2 bp for German STRIPS. During the financial
crisis, however, the bid-ask spread is expected to considerably increase leading to yield differences being
still insignificant economically. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the effective bid-ask spread.
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Figure 3.2: Coupon STRIPS Yields – Synthetic Yields (yC − r)
This figure shows the mean differences between coupon STRIPS yields and synthetic yields for the
two, five, and eight year maturity bin for the time period from January 2004 until September 2008.
during others.
The results for the German Bunds and STRIPS market strongly differ from the
findings of the previous chapter for the U.S. Treasury market. First, we do not find
negative mean yield differences between German coupon STRIPS and Bunds as they
are observed for short maturities in the U.S. Treasury market. In contrast, the yield
difference is significantly positive for all maturity bins. Second, the yield differences
do not show a clear maturity structure that may indicate different liquidity premia
for short and long maturities. Third, the yield differences in Germany are hardly
economically significant. Fourth, the volatility of the yield differences is much smaller
in Germany compared to the United States.
So far, we only have shown the existence of yield differences between coupon
STRIPS and Bunds. In the following, we try to explain their cross-sectional variation
and their time series behavior. Therefore, we relate the yield differences to the proxies
for liquidity and taxation as well as to the macroeconomic variables discussed in Section
3.2.2. We use end-of-month observations of yC−r in our regression analysis as stripping
information is available on a monthly basis only. Moreover, due to data availability, we
can analyze the impact of the stripping variables for the time period of the financial
crisis only. The augmented Dickey-Fuller tests show no sign of a unit root and, therefore,
Liquidity Premia in the Market for German Bunds and STRIPS 71
we use level variables. Table 3.3 shows the regression results that differ by the inclusion
of the lagged yield difference, the stripping variables, and the macroeconomic variables.
The results for Regressions (1) and (2) show the expected signs, but the
coefficients surprisingly are not significant except for the total issue volume of the
Bunds. Moreover, the adjusted R2 is negligible when the lag variable is not included
in the regression. These results imply that, at least during the period of the financial
crisis, the differences in Bund and STRIPS specific liquidity as well as the asynchronous
taxation cannot explain the yield differences. In contrast, the macroeconomic variables
have a significant impact. As shown in Regressions (3) and (4), the adjusted R2
rises substantially. As expected, VDAX -NEW has a significantly positive and ∆IFO
a significantly negative impact on the yield differences. This result indicates that
a market-wide liquidation risk shows up in the liquidity premia between STRIPS
and Bunds. Furthermore, we have considered the macroeconomic variables for short,
medium, and long maturities separately (not reported). However, the effect is nearly the
same for all maturity classes. Therefore, in contrast to Kempf et al. (2010), we conclude
that the macroeconomic variables do not affect the term structure of liquidity premia
differently at the short end and the long end.
The results remain stable when we exclude the variables on the outstanding
amount and examine the whole sample period. Regressions (5) and (6) show that the
market discount is still insignificant and all other variables have the expected sign, with
the macroeconomic variables being highly significant. Hence, the differences between
observed yields from coupon STRIPS and synthetic yields from Bunds are mainly
driven by a market-wide liquidation risk rather than by differences in the specific
securities or an effect due to the asynchronous taxation.
Comparing these results to the findings for the U.S. Treasury market, we identify
three important differences. First, the yield differences between German coupon
STRIPS and Bunds are not driven by the security-specific liquidity differences. This
result might be due to a substantially lower liquidity for German STRIPS compared to
a rather active, and thus more distinguishable Treasury STRIPS market. Second, the
yield differences do not show such a high persistence as the yield differences in the U.S.
Treasury market. Likewise, the adjusted R2 is much smaller for the German market.
Third, the macroeconomic variables measuring a market-wide liquidation risk have an
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Table 3.3: Regression Results of Explanatory Variables for Differences between Coupon
STRIPS Yields and Synthetic Yields
This table reports the estimated coefficients and the t-statistics from the regression of
the difference between coupon STRIPS yields and synthetic yields with the same time to
maturity. The yield differences are calculated in basis points and the total issue volume
TOT Bunds as well as the outstanding amount OAC are denoted in EUR billion. AGE
is given in years, DISCOUNT in EUR. OTR equals one if the Bund is on-the-run,
and zero otherwise. VDAX -NEW is Deutsche Bo¨rse’s volatility index measured in basis
points. ∆IFO denotes the first differences of the Ifo business climate index (measured
in percentage points). The t-statistic is shown below the coefficient estimates and is
computed using Newey-West HAC standard errors. *** (**,*) denotes the significance at
the 1% (5%, 10%) level. N is the number of monthly observations. The sample consists
of monthly observations from July 2007 to September 2008 (Regression 1-4) and from
January 2004 to September 2008 (Regression 5-6).
7/2007–8/2008 7/2007–8/2008 1/2004–8/2008
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 0.87 -0.14 -1.12 -2.91** 0.71*** 0.07
0.60 -0.12 -0.73 -2.01 2.77 0.29
TOT Bunds 0.07* 0.06* 0.05 0.05
1.69 1.68 1.32 1.47
OAC -1.06 -0.74 -0.13 -0.20
-0.28 -0.27 -0.04 -0.08
AGE 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.04
0.10 0.20 -0.21 0.28 -0.84 -1.28
OTR 0.82 0.54 0.70 0.59 0.39 0.13
1.05 1.26 0.93 1.24 1.26 0.61
DISCOUNT 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01
0.35 0.20 -0.10 0.60 0.07 -0.42
VDAX -NEW 7.52*** 10.78*** 4.63*** 4.78***
2.65 3.88 3.49 4.69
∆IFO -0.55*** -0.33*** -0.29*** -0.20***
-5.07 -3.11 -3.75 -3.49
Lag Variable 0.62*** 0.56*** 0.45***
5.70 5.00 4.87
N 327 325 327 325 883 864
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.228 0.136 0.302 0.057 0.222
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Figure 3.3: Principal STRIPS Yields – Synthetic Yields (yP − r)
This figure shows the mean difference between principal STRIPS yields and synthetic yields for each
maturity bin. For a given maturity bin, the mean is calculated over time for the period from January
2004 until June 2007 (pre-crisis) and from July 2007 until September 2008 (financial crisis). The
filled (empty) rectangles represent mean yield differences that (do not) significantly exceed the typical
bid-ask spread.
important impact. In contrast to the U.S. Treasury market, they affect short and long
maturities similarly.
3.3.2 Principal STRIPS Yields vs. Synthetic Yields
In this section, we investigate the differences between the yields of principal STRIPS
and the synthetic yields, yP − r. The results are computed and illustrated in the same
manner as the results in the previous section and displayed in Figure 3.3. Compared to
the yield difference yC − r depicted in Figure 3.1, we find three important differences.
First, it is striking that the mean yield differences yP − r are negative for all maturity
bins during the pre-crisis period. The detailed summary statistics presented in Table 3.4
even show that the mean and median differences are all significantly negative except for
maturity bin 9.0. Hence, we do not observe any yield premium as for coupon STRIPS
yields relative to synthetic yields. Second, the yield differences do not tend to increase
for longer maturities as it is the case for yC − r. Third, the yield differences do not
increase during the financial crisis for all maturity bins. However, the yield differences
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yP − r show a higher variation and may take positive and negative values.22 It is
important to note that even during the financial crisis the yield differences remain
small in absolute terms and do not exceed 1 bp on average. Moreover, an inspection
of the time series provides evidence that the yield differences vary rather randomly
around zero. Hence, taking transaction costs into account, principal STRIPS can be
regarded as being priced in line with Bunds.
As in the previous section, we formally test the relationship between the yield
differences and the proxies for liquidity, taxation, and liquidation risk. The results are
presented in Table 3.5. As for the differences between observed coupon STRIPS yields
and synthetic yields, Regressions (1) and (2) show the expected signs. The coefficients,
however, are not significant except for the outstanding amount. A higher outstanding
amount of STRIPS leads to a lower yield differences, meaning that principal STRIPS
that are hardly stripped trade at a yield premium compared to their corresponding
Bunds. Moreover, the market discount does not have a significant impact on the yield
differences, suggesting that an asynchronous taxation of STRIPS and Bunds does not
play a role. Regressions (3) to (6) show the impact of the macroeconomic variables.
During the financial crisis VDAX -NEW has a significantly positive impact, during the
whole sample period only the negative impact of ∆IFO is significant. Altogether, these
variables account for only a very small part of the variation in the yield differences.
Even if including the lagged yield difference, the R2 remains clearly below 10%.
The results in this section are in line with the findings of the previous chapter
for the U.S. Treasury market. However, it is surprising that even though 10 year
Bunds are hardly stripped in Germany, principal STRIPS are priced in line with
their corresponding synthetic yields. This result clearly suggests that the unique
reconstitution feature drives the relationship between the principal STRIPS and the
Bunds market. Moreover, taxation does not result in systematic yield differences and
liquidity hardly has an impact. In the next section, we compare the observed yields of
coupon and principal STRIPS and further investigate the robustness of our results by
explicitly controlling for tax effects.
22Detailed summary statistics for the financial crisis are given in Table B.2 in the appendix of this
chapter.
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Table 3.5: Regression Results of Explanatory Variables for Differences between
Principal STRIPS Yields and Synthetic Yields
This table reports the estimated coefficients and the t-statistics from the regression of the
difference between principal STRIPS yields and synthetic yields with the same time to
maturity. The yield differences are calculated in basis points and the total issue volume
TOT Bunds as well as the outstanding amount OAP are denoted in EUR billion. AGE
is given in years, DISCOUNT in EUR. OTR equals one if the Bund is on-the-run,
and zero otherwise. VDAX -NEW is Deutsche Bo¨rse’s volatility index measured in basis
points. ∆IFO denotes the first differences of the Ifo business climate index (measured
in percentage points). The t-statistic is shown below the coefficient estimates and is
computed using Newey-West HAC standard errors. *** (**,*) denotes the significance at
the 1% (5%, 10%) level. N is the number of monthly observations. The sample consists
of monthly observations from July 2007 to September 2008 (Regression 1-4) and from
January 2004 to September 2008 (Regression 5-6).
7/2007–8/2008 7/2007–8/2008 1/2004–8/2008
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -1.07 -0.87 -2.04* -2.50** -0.09 -0.17
-1.36 -1.21 -1.90 -2.42 -0.50 -0.98
TOT Bunds 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
1.48 1.39 1.23 1.17
OAP -1.42** -1.10** -1.41** -1.08**
-2.41 -2.21 -2.40 -2.22
AGE 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.06 -0.02 -0.02
1.29 0.95 1.34 1.13 -0.59 -0.59
OTR 0.56 0.26 0.55 0.51 -0.28 -0.29
1.33 0.51 1.24 1.06 -1.37 -1.50
DISCOUNT 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
0.79 0.33 0.81 0.85 1.02 0.28
VDAX -NEW 4.18** 6.77*** 0.57 1.13
2.00 2.68 0.74 1.38
∆IFO -0.14 -0.12 -0.10** -0.08
-1.48 -1.32 -2.04 -1.52
Lag Variable 0.35*** 0.38*** 0.28***
2.98 3.03 3.21
N 312 308 312 308 824 800
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.062 0.019 0.088 0.012 0.057
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Figure 3.4: Coupon STRIPS Yields – Principal STRIPS Yields (yP − yC)
This figure shows the mean difference between coupon STRIPS yields and principal STRIPS yields
for each maturity bin. For a given maturity bin, the mean is calculated over time for the period from
January 2004 until June 2007 (pre-crisis) and from July 2007 until September 2008 (financial crisis).
The filled (empty) rectangles represent mean yield differences that (do not) significantly exceed the
typical bid-ask spread.
3.3.3 Coupon STRIPS vs. Principal STRIPS
As in the U.S. Treasury market, matched-maturity coupon and principal STRIPS
provide exactly the same cash flows at maturity. Moreover, they are taxed
symmetrically for each type of investor that buys STRIPS on the secondary market.23
However, coupon and principal STRIPS differ in terms of their ability to reconstitute a
Bund as well as in terms of their liquidity. Since an option to reconstitute is implicitly
embedded in principal STRIPS, they should trade at lower yields compared to coupon
STRIPS. Liquidity premia, however, may boost or offset this effect, depending on the
liquidity differences between the coupon and principal STRIPS of a specific maturity.
Figure 3.4 shows the mean differences between observed yields of coupon and
principal STRIPS.24 We find that coupon STRIPS consistently trade at a yield
premium compared to principal STRIPS. This finding confirms the result of Huij et al.
23As noted in Section 3.2.1, the taxation of the two instruments differs only for private investors
that have originally stripped a Bund. This fact, however, should not have a differential impact on the
observed yields.
24Detailed summary statistics for the pre-crisis period and for the financial crisis are given in Table
B.3 in the appendix of this chapter.
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(2010) and further shows that the yield premium is positive for every maturity. In
addition, we provide an explanation for the observed yield differences in the following.
We observe that this figure is directly related to Figure 3.1: First, the mean yield
differences are greater than zero for each maturity bin. Second, the yield differences
are not significant economically during the pre-crisis period. Third, the yield differences
substantially increase during the period of the financial crisis. However, the observed
pattern of the yield differences yC − yP differ strongly from the results for the U.S.
Treasury market. Nevertheless, one striking finding is in common for both markets:
the yield differences yC − yP basically show the same pattern as their corresponding
yield differences yC − r. Since in both markets principal STRIPS are usually priced
according to the corresponding synthetic yields, the liquidity premia between coupon
STRIPS and Bunds seem to just pass through.
As in the previous sections, we relate the yield differences to the liquidity proxies
and to the macroeconomic variables defined in Section 3.2.2. To account for the differing
liquidity in the coupon and principal STRIPS market, we include the difference of the
outstanding amount, OAC − OAP . The age variable measures the age of a principal
STRIPS and we expect a similar effect as for the underlying Bund. Further, we control
for a potential on-the-run effect that may transmit from a Bund to its corresponding
principal STRIPS due to the unique reconstitution feature. Therefore, we include a
dummy variable with value one if the underlying Bund trades on-the-run, and zero
otherwise. In addition to these variables, we also include yC − r as a measure for the
liquidity premium of coupon STRIPS relative to Bunds. Thereby, we test whether the
liquidity premia transmit to the STRIPS market and show up in the yield differences
between coupon and principal STRIPS.
Table 3.6 presents the regression results that differ by the inclusion of the lagged
yield difference, the macroeconomic variables, and the liquidity premium between
coupon STRIPS yields and synthetic yields. As in the previous sections, the liquidity
variables are not significant even though their sign is as expected in the majority
of cases. The macroeconomic variables, however, show a similar impact as on the
differences between coupon STRIPS yields and synthetic yields and the adjusted R2
substantially increases when these variables are included. Moreover, the results remain
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stable when including the lagged yield difference.
Regressions (5) to (8) show the significantly positive impact of the liquidity
premium yC − r on the observed yield differences between coupon and principal
STRIPS. Comparing the adjusted R2 from Regression (2) to Regression (5), it is
striking that yC − r explains a higher part of the variation compared to the lagged
yield difference. The results remain stable when we exclude the difference of the
outstanding amounts and examine the whole sample period. Hence, the differences
between observed yields from coupon and principal STRIPS are mainly driven by a
market-wide liquidation risk and the theoretically obtained liquidity premia between
coupon STRIPS and Bunds.
This result is in line with the findings of Jordan et al. (2000) and the findings of
the previous chapter for the U.S. Treasury market. It shows the strong link between
the principal STRIPS and the corresponding Bund due to the unique reconstitution
feature. Hence, theoretically obtained liquidity premia between coupon STRIPS and
Bunds just pass through and drive the observed yield differences between coupon and
principal STRIPS. Direct liquidity differences between these STRIPS are of minor
importance.
3.4 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we investigate matched-maturity yield differences in the market for
German Bunds and STRIPS. We find that observed yields from coupon STRIPS
trade at a small liquidity premium compared to synthetic yields from Bunds. This
premium is more pronounced during the recent financial crisis and is mainly driven
by liquidity related macroeconomic variables. In contrast to the results for the U.S.
Treasury market, the liquidity premia are economically negligible and we do not observe
a sign change of the yield differences with increasing time to maturity.
Even though principal STRIPS are much less liquid than their corresponding
Bunds, we find them trading in line or even at a small yield discount compared to
synthetic yields. This result is striking and confirms the finding for the U.S. Treasury
market that the unique reconstitution feature leads investors to price principal STRIPS
analogously to their corresponding synthetic Bund yields.
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The finding also transmits to the yield differences between matched-maturity
coupon and principal STRIPS. It is surprising that coupon STRIPS trade at a
significant yield premium, even though they have higher outstanding amounts and
should be considered as more liquid than principal STRIPS. However, the strong
relation between principal STRIPS and their corresponding Bunds leads the liquidity
premia between coupon STRIPS and Bunds to just pass through.
Altogether, we have shown both an important distinction and an important
similarity between the German government bond market and the U.S. Treasury market.
First, due to liquidity differences relative to their corresponding bonds that may vary
over the whole maturity spectrum, coupon STRIPS are priced very differently in
Germany and the United States. Second, due to the unique reconstitution feature
that exists in Germany and the United States, principal STRIPS are anchored to trade
in line with their corresponding bonds.
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Chapter 4
Liquidity and Credit Risk Premia
in the Pfandbrief Market1
4.1 Introduction
It is generally accepted that the recent financial crisis has its origin in the granting of
subprime loans and their securitization. As the mortgage pools experienced declines in
credit quality and losses, the market prices of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and
other asset-backed securities (ABS) plummeted, leading to write-downs and losses all
over the world. Along with a number of moral hazard problems, this caused a general
crisis of confidence on the market for securitized mortgage loans. The confidence crisis
also considerably affected the market prices of covered bonds, even though they have
a different structure and bear different risks.
The increase of yields also spread to the German Pfandbrief market, although
Pfandbriefe are usually seen as close substitutes for high-quality government bonds and
there has never been a Pfandbrief default. Due to their security mechanisms and the
high quality of their collateral, Pfandbriefe have been considered virtually default-free.
Therefore, the yield spread with respect to German government securities has often
been interpreted as a liquidity premium. During the recent financial crisis, however,
one has observed yield differences between segments of the Pfandbrief market or single
1This chapter is based on a working paper co-authored with Jan Siewert. Cf. Siewert and Vonhoff
(2010).
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Pfandbrief issues whose liquidity is nearly the same. Hence, it is becoming evident that
the yield spread between Pfandbriefe and German government securities cannot be
interpreted as a pure liquidity premium.
The purpose of this study is an in-depth analysis of the yield spreads within
the Pfandbrief market. We investigate the main risk factors perceived by investors
and their relative valuation for the time period from 2000 to 2009. In particular, we
examine whether liquidity, the quality of the issuer, the type of collateral, or the quality
of the underlying cover pool is the main driver of the yield spreads between individual
Pfandbriefe. Moreover, we gain insights into the behavior of Pfandbrief spreads during
different periods – the pre-crisis period and the period of the recent financial crisis.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, in contrast to the assumption
of Koziol and Sauerbier (2007) or Kempf et al. (2010), we show that liquidity is an
important, but not the exclusive factor when explaining Pfandbrief yield spreads.
Second, in addition to previous studies such as Birkmeyer and Herbert (2002) and
Breger and Stovel (2004), we analyze individual Pfandbrief spreads over time and
explicitly account for the issuers’ default risk. Third, we are the first to study the
impact of the cover pool quality by using the publications according to § 28 Pfandbrief
Act.
With its origin in 1769, the German Pfandbrief is one of the oldest asset-backed
securities in the world. The cover pools mainly consist of high-quality public sector loans
or prime mortgage loans. With an average outstanding volume of EUR 916 billion, the
Pfandbrief market is one of the largest fixed income markets in the world.2 In contrast
to MBS and ABS, however, the structure is quite different: (i) the Pfandbrief is a claim
on the issuer and the cover loans remain on the issuer’s balance sheet instead of being
transferred to a special purpose vehicle, (ii) the coupon and redemption payments are
agreed on in advance and the investor does not bear any prepayment risks, (iii) the
direct access to the cover pool is only necessary if the issuer defaults on its liabilities,
(iv) there are very strict legal requirements with regard to the allowed pool assets and
their valuation,3 (v) pool borrowers are liable with all of their assets and not only
2Pfandbrief market statistics (2003–2009), Association of German Pfandbrief Banks (vdp).
3In comparison to other covered bond markets, the Pfandbrief is considered to have the most
restrictive legal requirements.
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with the underlying real estate property (no jingle mail). This strong legal protection
certainly is one of the reasons that a default on a Pfandbrief has never occurred. As
the Pfandbrief has proven to be a successful source of German mortgage and public-
sector loan funding and solves some of the moral hazard problems associated with MBS
and other ABS, the introduction of a similar covered bond legislation is currently also
discussed in the United States.4
Our study is particularly related to the literature on German Pfandbriefe and, in
general, to the literature on liquidity and credit risk premia in fixed income markets.
Despite the ample size of the German Pfandbrief market and its systemic importance
for the German banking system, there are only few academic studies analyzing this
market in detail. Empirical studies of the Pfandbrief market usually investigate the
yield difference between Pfandbriefe and German government bonds (Bunds). Bu¨hler
and Hies (1998) and Jobst (2006) investigate the spread dynamics, but do not come
up with an economic explanation for the yield differences. Rees (2001) develops a
forecasting model for the 10 year Pfandbrief spread using macroeconomic factors. This
model, however, does not differentiate between the different types of Pfandbriefe. Koziol
and Sauerbier (2007) and Kempf et al. (2010) argue that Pfandbriefe are considered
as default-free and that yield differences between Pfandbriefe and Bunds have to be
ascribed to liquidity differences. With this presumption, they estimate term structures
of illiquidity spreads between Pfandbriefe and Bunds. In contrast to their findings,
our results show that liquidity is an important, but not the exclusive factor driving
Pfandbrief yield spreads.
Scha¨fer and Hochstein (1999) and Birkmeyer and Herbert (2002) investigate yield
differences in the market for Jumbo Pfandbriefe and relate them to several explanatory
variables like the outstanding amount and the Pfandbrief rating. Whereas Scha¨fer and
Hochstein (1999) conclude that the Jumbo Pfandbrief market is rather homogenous,
Birkmeyer and Herbert (2002) find higher yields for Pfandbriefe issued by mortgage
banks relative to public banks. They expect an increasing importance of the issuer’s
quality for the relative pricing of Jumbo Pfandbriefe. Breger and Stovel (2004) study the
effect of credit risk and liquidity in the market for traditional and Jumbo Pfandbriefe.
4See, e.g., Lucas et al. (2008) and Bernanke (2009).
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The authors find a significant liquidity premium of 15 bp between traditional and
Jumbo Pfandbriefe whereas differences between AAA and AA rated Pfandbriefe do
not have a significant effect. Su¨nderhauf (2006) investigates the impact of the issuer’s
default risk on the pricing of Pfandbriefe. By applying and calibrating a structural
Merton (1974)-type model for a Pfandbrief bank, he comes to the conclusion that
mortgage Pfandbriefe should be considered as widely independent from the issuer’s
quality. We extend this strand of literature by conducting an in-depth analysis of
individual Pfandbrief spreads. In addition to the previous studies, we consider the
time-variation by investigating different market environments and explicitly account
for the issuers’ default risk. Moreover, we are the first to study the impact of the cover
pool quality by using the publications according to § 28 Pfandbrief Act.
In a study of the European covered bond market, Packer et al. (2007) argue
that the pricing of covered bonds is robust to idiosyncratic shocks to issuer credit risk
and to the value of cover pools. In contrast to their study, we find that, particularly
during times of financial turmoil, the issuer rating as well as the cover pool quality has
a considerable impact on the yield spreads. In general, we do not aim to contribute
to the literature on yield differences between covered bonds in different regulatory
environments. Former studies like Packer et al. (2007) and Volk and Hillenbrand (2006)
have shown that covered bond yields significantly depend on the nationality of the
issuer. As a uniform covered bond regulation does not exist in Europe, it is nearly
impossible to meaningfully compare and to unambiguously extract the different risk
components. Therefore, we focus on the German Pfandbrief market with a uniform
regulatory environment for all issues.
A large number of studies investigate liquidity and credit risk premia in the
corporate bond market. These studies, like Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Longstaff
et al. (2005), Chen et al. (2007), De Jong and Driessen (2007), and Dick-Nielsen et al.
(2009), mostly study unsecured bonds that are not backed by collateral. Studies in
the corporate bond market, however, suffer from a considerable heterogeneity of bond
characteristics and the issuers strongly differ in terms of risk even within a rating class.
Therefore, the authors have to rely on strong assumptions to disentangle liquidity
and credit risk. In contrast, due to the high level of standardization and the legal
requirements, it is relatively easy to isolate the different risk components within the
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Pfandbrief market.
The main results of our study are the following. First, we show that liquidity is
not the exclusive driver of yield spreads between Pfandbriefe and German government
bonds and issuer-specific effects as well as the quality of the cover pool are also relevant.
Second, yield spreads between individual Pfandbriefe are mainly driven by their relative
liquidity and whether they are covered by public-sector or mortgage loans. Whereas
the type of cover assets appears to be less important during the recent financial crisis,
liquidity proves to have the most important effect and accounts for up to 70 bp of the
yield spread. Third, our empirical results reveal that Pfandbrief investors demand an
additional default risk premium between low rated and high rated issuers of 7 bp during
normal market conditions and up to 40 bp during the financial crisis. Fourth, the impact
of the cover pool quality appears to be quite small. During the recent financial crisis,
however, maturity mismatches between Pfandbriefe and their corresponding cover pool
assets, the fraction of German cover assets and the granularity of the cover pool show
a significant impact on the yield spreads.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we begin
by describing the institutional details of the Pfandbrief market. Section 4.3 describes
the methodology of our analysis and presents the data. In Section 4.4, we provide and
discuss the empirical results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Details of the Pfandbrief Market
This section reviews the most important features and the regulatory background of the
German Pfandbrief market.5 The legal basis for a Pfandbrief issuance is the Pfandbrief
Act of 2005 that replaced the Public Pfandbrief Act (O¨PG) and the Mortgage Bank
Act (HBG) dating back to 1900. Until 2005, Pfandbrief issuers had to be specialized
banks, but nowadays every wholesale bank is allowed to apply for a Pfandbrief licence.
The Pfandbrief Act, however, sets restrictive formalities such that Pfandbriefe are
highly standardized and investors can easily assess their quality. Beyond the general
5A more detailed description of the German Pfandbrief and the European covered bond markets
can be found, e.g., in Mastroeni (2001), Packer et al. (2007), and Cross (2008). Moreover, Peterson
(2008) investigates the main differences between Pfandbriefe and ABS.
92
banking supervision under the terms of the German Banking Act (KWG), Pfandbrief
issuers are permanently supervised by an independent trustee appointed by the German
financial supervisory authority (BaFin). This strong regulation is set up to ensure
timely payment and remoteness in the case of bankruptcy.
Pfandbriefe are dual recourse bonds with (i) a claim on the issuer and (ii) a
priority claim on an underlying asset pool in case of a default. The cover pool is
kept on the issuer’s balance sheet and only separated in case of the issuer’s default.
The cover pool mainly consists of high-quality public-sector or first-rank residential
and commercial mortgage loans.6 Pfandbriefe backed by loans to public-sector entities
are called public Pfandbriefe and those backed by mortgage loans are referred to as
mortgage Pfandbriefe. It is important to note that every issuer has only one cover pool
for each Pfandbrief segment. Hence, every public Pfandbrief of an issuer is backed by
the same issuer-specific public cover pool and every mortgage Pfandbrief by the same
issuer-specific mortgage cover pool. The Pfandbrief Act sets conservative guidelines for
the quality, the size, and the valuation of the cover assets as well as to its supervision
to ensure timely payments in case of an issuer’s default. Moreover, Pfandbriefe are not
subject to prepayment risk, and matured or defaulted loans in the cover pool have to
be replaced by the issuer. The issuer also has to assure that the present value of the
cover pool assets always exceeds the present value of the outstanding Pfandbriefe by
at least 2%. This dynamic feature of the cover pool further ensures a sustainable high
collateral value for the Pfandbrief.
Public Pfandbriefe are issued on loans to the federal government, the federal
state governments, local authorities, and public-sector institutions in the European
Economic Area, Switzerland, the U.S., Canada and Japan. Moreover, loans to German
public agencies or public banks that are guaranteed by these bodies are eligible for
the public cover pool. It is noteworthy that the withdrawn public sector guarantees for
Landesbanks and for debt issued by savings banks in 2005 have led to a shrinking supply
of public-sector collateral and, therefore, public Pfandbriefe.7 Mortgage Pfandbriefe
are covered by first rank mortgage loans fully collateralized by real estate properties
6Moreover, Pfandbriefe on ship and airplane loans exist, but only account for a small fraction of
the Pfandbrief market.
7See, e.g., ECB (2008), p. 10.
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in the European Economic Area, Switzerland, the U.S., Canada and Japan. The
underlying properties may be residential, commercial, or both. The loan-to-value ratio
of each underlying loan must not exceed 60% and is subject to permanent supervision.
Compared to covered bond legislation in other countries or MBS, the maximum loan-to-
value ratio required for Pfandbriefe is most conservative. For the purpose of liquidity
management, maturity-matching between cover assets and outstanding Pfandbriefe,
and currency hedging, it is allowed to further include specified claims against qualified
banks as well as derivatives.
Pfandbrief holders have preferential claims on the cover assets in the event of
an issuer’s insolvency. In this case, the cover pools are separated and managed by
an independent trustee (“Sachwalter”) in favor of the Pfandbrief holders. The cover
pools are not included in the insolvency proceedings until the Pfandbrief creditors are
fully redeemed. Alternatively, another Pfandbrief issuer may take over the cover assets
and serve the Pfandbrief payments in a timely manner. An early repayment of the
Pfandbrief should be avoided. All these arrangements are set to ensure that Pfandbrief
holders are additionally protected against insolvency caused outside the issuer’s cover
operations and that the Pfandbrief payments occur on time.
An important Pfandbrief segment is the market for Jumbo Pfandbriefe. This
segment is defined by minimum standards agreed on by Pfandbrief banks. It was
introduced in 1995 in order to increase the liquidity of large Pfandbrief issues. Jumbo
Pfandbriefe are required to be plain-vanilla bearer bonds with fixed coupon payments,
a bullet payment at maturity, and without embedded options. The minimal issue size
is EUR 1 billion. Moreover, Jumbo Pfandbriefe have to be listed at an exchange, and
at least five market makers have to continuously provide a price quote for a trading
volume of up to EUR 15 million. In addition, the quoted bid-ask spread is not allowed
to exceed a maturity-dependent boundary. These standards significantly enhance the
liquidity in this segment, and Jumbo Pfandbriefe are very actively traded.8 Smaller
and less liquid issues in either bearer or registered form are commonly referred to as
traditional Pfandbriefe.
8See, e.g., Winkler (2006).
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4.3 Data and Methodology
4.3.1 Bond Prices and Yield Spreads
Our sample period covers the time span from January 2000 until January 2009. To
gain insight into the behavior of liquidity and credit risk premia during the recent
financial turmoil, we divide our sample period into three sub-sample periods. The first
sub-sample period is referred to as pre-crisis and covers the time span prior to the
subprime crisis. It ranges from January 2000 until June 2007. The second sub-sample
period lasts from July 2007 until 14 September 2008 and is considered the subprime
crisis. The third sub-sample period starts after the collapse of Lehman Brothers on
15 September 2008 and ends in January 2009. We refer to the last period as the post-
Lehman period.
We consider all public and mortgage Pfandbriefe outstanding in our sample period
with fixed coupon and without embedded options. Our total sample consists of 6,398
Pfandbriefe issued by 80 different banks. We exclude all Pfandbriefe that do not have at
least one price quote during the sample period or for which the prices exceed reasonable
bounds.9 Since trading close to maturity is particularly thin and small pricing errors
translate into relatively large annualized yield errors, we exclude all Pfandbriefe with
less than six months to maturity. After this data preparation, we remain with 2,592
Pfandbrief issues and almost 182,000 weekly price observations.
We use weekly mid prices obtained via Bloomberg over the whole observation
period. Approximately 60%–70% of the Pfandbrief market volume is traded over the
phone and most of the remaining part on electronic trading platforms.10 Due to
marginal trading on stock exchanges, Bloomberg is the most reliable source available
since prices are provided by at least five contributors.11 Bloomberg prices are quoted on
a three-day settlement basis, and we compute accrued interest using the respective day
count fraction. We select Wednesdays as valuation days as very few holidays happen to
coincide with Wednesdays. We use the price of the same week’s Tuesday or Thursday
9We exclude price quotes below 1% and above 500% that are apparently due to data errors.
10See, e.g., Winkler (2006), p. 25.
11The prices are indicative and do not represent actual transactions. However, we cross-check our
results with data provided by Morgan Stanley and did not find meaningful differences.
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if a Wednesday price is not available. In this case, we adjust the calculation of accrued
interest.
Table 4.1 presents the summary information of the data set. Panel A shows
that traditional Pfandbriefe account for the major part of the number of issues in
the German Pfandbrief market. However, we have access to price data of only 35% of
these issues in contrast to 90% of the Jumbo issues. Moreover, Jumbo and traditional
Pfandbrief issues differ considerably in terms of their outstanding amount which is
approximately 10 times higher for Jumbos, and the Jumbos in our sample appear to
have a slightly longer time to maturity on average. Due to the higher liquidity in the
Jumbo segment, it is not surprising that the number of weekly bond price observations
for Jumbos exceeds the number for traditional Pfandbriefe. This discrepancy is even
more pronounced during the financial crisis. Moreover, it is important to note that
nearly all Jumbo and approximately 90% of all traditional Pfandbrief price observations
used in our study are on Wednesdays.
Panel B of Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the Pfandbrief issues with respect
to the issuer rating classes. Pfandbrief issues are grouped into the classes according
to their issuers’ long-term credit rating. We calculate this rating as the average rating
from the three major rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. Pfandbrief
issuers are mainly rated AA and A and the rating classes are similarly distributed in
each of the Pfandbrief segments. As no issuer is rated AAA during the financial crisis
periods and the number of issuers rated BB is rather small, we consider only the three
different rating segments AAA/AA, A, and BBB/BB for our empirical study.
We compute individual yield spreads for every Pfandbrief on a weekly basis
relative to (i) German government bonds (Bunds) and (ii) public Jumbo Pfandbriefe.
We choose Bunds as the natural risk-free benchmark and public Jumbo Pfandbriefe as
they are considered the safest and most liquid instruments in the Pfandbrief market.
This approach facilitates identifying risk premia within the Pfandbrief market that
are not driven by factors that affect the Pfandbrief market as a whole. For yield
spreads relative to Bunds, we use Nelson and Siegel (1987) term structure estimates
provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. For public-sector Jumbo Pfandbriefe, we
estimate the Nelson-Siegel parameters on a weekly basis by minimizing the squared
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differences between estimated and observed yields.12 The mean absolute yield error of
the estimation is 3.67 bp on average.
To avoid distortions due to maturity, coupon, or taxation effects as in the case of
simply comparing yields-to-maturity of duration-matched bonds, we define the yield
spread of an individual Pfandbrief as follows: First, we calculate a theoretical bond price
as the bond’s cash flows discounted with the benchmark yield curve. Second, given the
theoretical and the actual bond price, we compute the theoretical and the observed
yield-to-maturity. The yield spread is the difference between the actually observed and
the theoretical yield.
4.3.2 Explanatory Variables
We relate the obtained yield spreads to the following explanatory variables that capture
the different risk factors within the Pfandbrief market. These factors should, at least
partially, account for the yield differences between particular issues.
It is an advantage of the Pfandbrief market that different risk components are
relatively easy to identify by just comparing the different market segments. First,
we compare the yield spread between mortgage and public Jumbo Pfandbriefe by
introducing a mortgage Jumbo dummy variable. Usually, at least before the advent
of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, Pfandbriefe backed by mortgages are considered to
be more risky than Pfandbriefe backed by high-quality public-sector debt. Therefore,
we expect mortgage Jumbo Pfandbriefe to trade at a credit risk yield premium
compared to public Jumbo Pfandbriefe. Second, we introduce a dummy for a public
traditional Pfandbrief. By definition, Jumbo Pfandbriefe are more liquid in terms of
outstanding volume, a maximal bid-ask spread, and the vested market-making, among
others. Hence, public traditional Pfandbriefe should trade at a liquidity yield premium
compared to public Jumbo Pfandbriefe. Third, a dummy for traditional mortgage
Pfandbriefe measures the joint effect of liquidity and credit risk. For the sovereign bond
market, Favero et al. (2010) find yield differences increasing in both liquidity and credit
risk with an interaction term of the opposite sign. Moreover, Bu¨hler and Trapp (2010)
12This approach is consistent with the methodology of Deutsche Bundesbank. See, e.g., Schich
(1997), p. 18.
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find a negative correlation between liquidity and credit risk for high quality AAA rated
corporate bonds.13 As the Pfandbrief market is comparable to the European sovereign
bond market and to high quality corporate bonds in terms of liquidity and credit risk,
it is reasonable to expect a similar result, i.e. a yield premium that is positive, but
smaller than the sum of the pure liquidity and the pure credit risk premium.
It is straightforward to classify the different Pfandbrief issues with respect to their
Pfandbrief rating. The Pfandbrief rating mainly measures the quality of the underlying
cover pool. For a high Pfandbrief rating, it has to be highly plausible that the Pfandbrief
payments can be made by the underlying cover pool even if the issuer defaults. At the
outset, Pfandbrief ratings were independent from the general financial strength of the
issuer, but nowadays rating agencies also consider the issuer rating to compute a limit
for the highest possible Pfandbrief rating.14 As Pfandbriefe are backed by the cover
pool, however, their rating exceeds or is at least equal to the issuer’s long term credit
rating.
We use data on the issuance rating published by Bloomberg. This data, however,
should be used with care as the fraction of several rating classes changes significantly
over time. At the beginning of our sample period, 80% of all price observations are from
Pfandbriefe that are not rated. This number declines to approximately 45% until the
end of 2004, presumably driven by rating requirements from investors. Starting with
the advent of the subprime crisis, this fraction steadily declines below 1%. This sharp
decline provides evidence that Pfandbriefe without rating are scarcely traded during
the recent financial turmoil. Moreover, conversation with Pfandbrief issuers suggest
that in recent years it has become hardly possible to place a Pfandbrief without rating
due to the investors’ requirements. Vice versa, the fraction of AAA-rated Pfandbrief
observations increase from 20% to 88% during our sample period and the fraction of
AA-rated Pfandbrief observations from 0% to 11%.
Even though Pfandbriefe are backed by high-quality cover pools that may serve
the Pfandbrief payments after an issuer’s default, the issuer rating may also have an
impact on their relative pricing. For our study, we use the long-term issuer credit
13For lower rated bonds, however, they find a positive correlation.
14Standard & Poor’s were the last to consider the issuer’s rating when they changed their rating
methodology at the end of 2009.
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rating from the three major rating agencies Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s
and calculate an average rating. The issuer rating serves as a measure for the issuer’s
default risk, and its impact on the yield spread can be interpreted either as credit risk
premium or as liquidity premium, or both. The credit risk view considers that the cover
pool may not be sufficient to serve the Pfandbrief payments after the issuer’s default.
Then, a direct loss on the Pfandbrief may occur. The liquidity view deems the cover
pool to be valuable enough to serve the payments but anticipates a collapse in trading
the defaulted issuer’s Pfandbriefe. Since both risks are serious for investors and should
affect the yield spread in the same direction, it is difficult to isolate the particular
premia. In general, however, a better long-term issuer credit rating should lead to a
lower yield spread.15
Pfandbrief issuers also differ by the type of institution. Pfandbriefe issued by
Landesbanks until 18 July 2005 are guaranteed by the German federal states through
a so-called guarantor liability (“Gewa¨hrtra¨gerhaftung”) mechanism.16 Due to this
guarantee, we expect Landesbanks’ Pfandbriefe that are issued until 18 July 2005
trading at a yield discount relative to comparable Pfandbriefe of other issuers. After
its discontinuation, the yield spreads should rise considerably. Moreover, we investigate
whether Landesbank Pfandbriefe trade at significant discounts or premia during the
recent financial turmoil.
Typical proxies for the liquidity of a fixed income security are trading activity,
the bid-ask spread, the proportion of zero-return days, the outstanding amount, and
the age. For this study, only the last two proxies are available. A higher outstanding
amount signals a higher liquidity and, therefore, should lead to a lower yield spread.
Moreover, trading directly after the issuance date is usually more active and diminishes
as the security ages. Therefore, the liquidity premium and, thus, the yield spread should
be positively related to the Pfandbrief’s age. To account for differences in the maturity
spectrum of the Pfandbriefe, we standardize the liquidity measure and use the relative
age, i.e. the age divided by the initial time to maturity.
15Instead of only using the rating categories, the use of the Pfandbrief issuers’ CDS spreads would
be a meaningful alternative. Unfortunately, CDS spreads are not available for most of the issuers.
16Due to a Grandfather clause, Pfandbriefe issued after 19 July 2001 are guaranteed if they do not
mature after 31 December 2015.
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For our study we also consider fixed effects for the single Pfandbrief issuers.
Thereby, we take idiosyncratic effects like the financial disorder of Allgemeine
Hypothekenbank Rheinboden (AHBR) in 2001–2005 and the tremendous problems
of DEPFA and Hypo Real Estate during the recent financial turmoil into account. We
will address these particular effects when presenting our empirical results.
4.3.3 Cover Pool Information According to § 28 Pfandbrief Act
For an in-depth yield spread analysis, we further obtain information on the particular
cover pools. Since the Pfandbrief Act came into effect on 19 July 2005, issuers are
required to publish details of their cover pool composition to enhance the transparency
of the Pfandbrief market. These publications according to § 28 Pfandbrief Act are
compulsory for all issuers starting on 31 December 2005 and are released on a quarterly
basis as of 31 March, 30 June, 30 September, and 31 December. The reports are usually
published on the issuer’s website within six weeks after the reporting date.17
The transparency report of an issuer basically contains the following information
on the public-sector cover pool and all outstanding public Pfandbriefe as well as on the
mortgage cover pool and all outstanding mortgage Pfandbriefe:18
– Notional Pfandbrief volume outstanding, the corresponding cover pool values,
and the amount of overcollateralization
– Present value19 of outstanding Pfandbriefe, the corresponding cover pool present
values, and the amount of overcollateralization
– Maturity profile of outstanding Pfandbriefe and cover loans
– Categorization of mortgage cover pool by cover loan size
– Breakdown of public cover pool by borrower’s place of residence
17Recently, the Association of German Pfandbrief Banks has started a transparency initiative and
publishes the reports of all their members in a uniform format on their website. This data, however,
only dates back to the fourth quarter 2009.
18Additional cover pool assets and derivatives as well as the cover loans being overdue for at least
90 days are also reported. These values, however, usually account for a negligible fraction of the cover
pool and, therefore, are not considered in our study.
19In this context, the “present value” is defined according to the Pfandbrief-Barwertverordnung
(PfandBarwertV) as the sum of future cash flows discounted by using customary yield curves.
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– Breakdown of mortgage cover pool by real property location and property type
financed
We collect these data for 40 Pfandbrief issuers from their website or their investor
relations department for the time span from December 2005 to December 2008.20
These dates are determined by the first compulsory report and the last report within
our sample period, respectively. Table 4.2 presents the summary information for the
cover pool information. The results show that cover pools differ considerably between
different issuers. For public Pfandbriefe, for example, the cover pool’s notional values
range between EUR 60 million and EUR 91,383 million. For mortgage Pfandbriefe, the
range lies between EUR 75 million and EUR 54,237 million. On average, approximately
3/4 of the total cover pool consists of public-sector loans. This number slightly declines
over time.
Most of the outstanding Pfandbriefe and cover pool loans have a maturity of 1
to 5 years with slight differences between the issuers. For public Pfandbriefe, a large
fraction of the pool consists of German cover pool assets. For mortgage Pfandbriefe,
the majority is also backed by German cover loans. Whereas a considerable amount of
commercial mortgages in the cover pools is from abroad, there is only a small amount
of foreign residential mortgages. However, there is a great variety between issuers since
issuers without any German cover pool asset as well as issuers without any foreign
cover pool asset exist.
Recognizing the differences between the cover pools, we define the following
explanatory variables to capture the different types of risk within the cover pools.
These variables are calculated for every Pfandbrief issuer on a quarterly basis.
– Overcollateralization: OC = Cover pool value – Outstanding amount Pfandbriefe
Outstanding amount Pfandbriefe
– Term transformation: TRANS =
Average maturity of pool assets – Average maturity of outstanding Pfandbriefe
– Percentage of Pfandbriefe due the following year:
PBDUE =
Amount of Pfandbriefe due next year
Outstanding amount Pfandbriefe
20Due to mergers and acquisitions within the last years, the number of Pfandbrief banks in our
sample dropped to 46. Six issuers with in total only 27 outstanding Pfandbriefe do not report according
to the current Pfandbrief Act.
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– Percentage of cover loans due the following year:
CLDUE =
Amount of cover loans due next year
Total amount cover loans
– Percentage of German cover pool assets: GERM = Amount of German cover pool assets
Total amount cover pool assets
– Percentage of small cover loans: SMALL = Amount of cover loans ≤ EUR 300.000
Total amount cover loans
– Percentage of large cover loans: LARGE = Amount of cover loans > EUR 5 million
Total amount cover loans
– Percentage of residential cover loans: RES = Amount of residential cover loans
Total amount cover loans
– Percentage of commercial cover loans: COM = Amount of commercial over loans
Total amount cover loans
Table 4.3 shows the summary statistics of these variables. Overcollateralization (OC )
can be measured on a notional or present value basis. The median OC amounts to
9.8% for public and 17.8% for mortgage Pfandbriefe on a notional basis and is slightly
higher in terms of present value. § 4 Pfandbrief Act requires the OC to be a least 2%
on a present value basis and, therefore, the minimum is always above this value. The
extreme maximum values are for WestLB that had already built a large cover pool when
it started to issue the first public-sector Pfandbriefe under the new Pfandbrief Act, and
for SachsenLB with many cover loans, but hardly any mortgage Pfandbrief outstanding
shortly before taken over by LBBW. Maintaining the OC on a higher level than the
minimum level is often required by rating agencies for assigning a specific Pfandbrief
rating. In particular, this requirement is made for mortgage Pfandbriefe, leading to a
higher OC on average. In general, however, a higher amount of OC shows a relatively
higher amount of assets to guarantee for the outstanding Pfandbrief payments for both,
public and mortgage Pfandbriefe. Therefore, we expect the yield spread to be negatively
related to OC .
The term transformation (TRANS ) measures the volume-weighted average
maturity of cover pool assets versus outstanding Pfandbriefe. If TRANS is zero, the
average maturities coincide. A higher TRANS signals a shorter average maturity of
the outstanding Pfandbriefe, a smaller one signals a shorter average maturity of the
cover pool. On average, TRANS is slightly below 1/2 year, i.e. the average cover pool
maturity is 1/2 year longer than the average maturity of the outstanding Pfandbriefe.
However, there may be large maturity mismatches since TRANS ranges between −6
Liquidity and Credit Risk Premia in the Pfandbrief Market 105
T
ab
le
4.
3:
S
u
m
m
ar
y
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
of
C
ov
er
P
o
ol
E
x
p
la
n
at
or
y
V
ar
ia
b
le
s
T
hi
s
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
th
e
su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
of
th
e
co
ve
r
po
ol
ex
pl
an
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
s.
P
an
el
A
sh
ow
s
th
e
da
ta
fo
r
pu
bl
ic
P
fa
nd
br
ie
fe
,
P
an
el
B
fo
r
m
or
tg
ag
e
P
fa
nd
br
ie
fe
.
T
he
nu
m
be
rs
ar
e
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
fr
om
qu
ar
te
rl
y
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
fo
r
40
P
fa
nd
br
ie
f
is
su
er
s.
D
ue
to
is
su
er
s
w
it
h
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g
P
fa
nd
br
ie
fe
in
on
ly
on
e
se
gm
en
t
an
d
du
e
to
ac
qu
is
it
io
ns
of
P
fa
nd
br
ie
f
is
su
er
s,
w
e
re
m
ai
n
w
it
h
45
3
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
fo
r
pu
bl
ic
P
fa
nd
br
ie
fe
an
d
39
8
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
fo
r
m
or
tg
ag
e
P
fa
nd
br
ie
fe
.
T
he
to
ta
l
sa
m
pl
e
co
ns
is
ts
of
qu
ar
te
rl
y
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
fr
om
13
qu
ar
te
rs
as
of
D
ec
em
be
r
20
05
to
D
ec
em
be
r
20
08
.
P
an
el
A
:
P
u
b
li
c
P
fa
n
d
b
ri
ef
e
V
ar
ia
bl
e
M
ea
n
St
d.
D
ev
.
M
in
im
um
25
%
P
er
c.
M
ed
ia
n
75
%
P
er
c.
M
ax
im
um
O
ve
rc
ol
la
te
ra
liz
at
io
n
(n
ot
io
na
l)
0.
27
49
0.
62
41
0.
01
12
0.
05
06
0.
09
76
0.
21
12
8.
13
04
O
ve
rc
ol
la
te
ra
liz
at
io
n
(p
re
se
nt
va
lu
e)
0.
34
53
1.
05
72
0.
02
68
0.
07
31
0.
11
28
0.
22
35
14
.2
73
0
A
ve
ra
ge
te
rm
tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n
(y
ea
rs
)
0.
43
23
1.
42
32
-5
.0
12
0
-0
.3
61
1
0.
47
58
1.
14
38
6.
02
25
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
of
P
fa
nd
br
ie
fe
du
e
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
ye
ar
0.
18
24
0.
12
90
0.
00
00
0.
10
81
0.
18
20
0.
24
38
0.
93
74
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
of
co
ve
r
lo
an
s
du
e
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
ye
ar
0.
20
39
0.
14
37
0.
00
00
0.
09
75
0.
16
82
0.
31
17
0.
83
17
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
G
er
m
an
co
ve
r
po
ol
as
se
ts
0.
85
57
0.
13
53
0.
30
58
0.
78
88
0.
88
51
0.
96
33
1.
00
00
P
an
el
B
:
M
or
tg
ag
e
P
fa
n
d
b
ri
ef
e
V
ar
ia
bl
e
M
ea
n
St
d.
D
ev
.
M
in
im
um
25
%
P
er
c.
M
ed
ia
n
75
%
P
er
c.
M
ax
im
um
O
ve
rc
ol
la
te
ra
liz
at
io
n
(n
ot
io
na
l)
1.
49
32
6.
16
83
0.
02
28
0.
08
95
0.
17
76
0.
65
06
61
.4
23
0
O
ve
rc
ol
la
te
ra
liz
at
io
n
(p
re
se
nt
va
lu
e)
1.
46
54
5.
70
29
0.
04
06
0.
11
44
0.
20
35
0.
70
24
56
.4
23
0
A
ve
ra
ge
te
rm
tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n
(y
ea
rs
)
0.
46
90
1.
78
85
-6
.1
13
2
-0
.7
95
1
0.
35
36
1.
59
77
5.
62
63
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
of
P
fa
nd
br
ie
fe
du
e
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
ye
ar
0.
15
90
0.
16
20
0.
00
00
0.
04
85
0.
13
35
0.
21
45
1.
00
00
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
of
co
ve
r
lo
an
s
du
e
th
e
fo
llo
w
in
g
ye
ar
0.
20
82
0.
14
13
0.
00
00
0.
10
80
0.
16
45
0.
27
74
0.
73
31
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
of
G
er
m
an
co
ve
r
po
ol
as
se
ts
0.
89
43
0.
20
08
0.
08
49
0.
89
44
0.
97
97
1.
00
00
1.
00
00
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
of
sm
al
l
co
ve
r
lo
an
s
0.
33
22
0.
30
25
0.
00
00
0.
05
03
0.
24
49
0.
59
79
0.
99
51
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
of
la
rg
e
co
ve
r
lo
an
s
0.
40
51
0.
29
80
0.
00
00
0.
11
25
0.
38
66
0.
62
90
1.
00
00
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
of
re
si
de
nt
ia
l
co
ve
r
lo
an
s
0.
49
30
0.
28
56
0.
00
00
0.
23
15
0.
50
13
0.
75
58
1.
00
00
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
of
co
m
m
er
ci
al
co
ve
r
lo
an
s
0.
50
70
0.
28
56
0.
00
00
0.
24
42
0.
49
87
0.
76
85
1.
00
00
106
and 6 years. In general, a maturity mismatch may cause several problems. First,
the cover pool and the outstanding Pfandbriefe may react differently to interest rate
changes. Second, a shorter maturity of the outstanding Pfandbriefe may lead to the
need of refinancing for the issuer. In particular, this is important when markets dry up
and refinancing is difficult. Third, a shorter maturity of the cover pool may force the
issuer to provide additional cover assets. Therefore, a higher TRANS as well as a lower
TRANS may signal higher risks for the Pfandbrief holder and we expect a positive
relation between the yield spread and |TRANS |.
The interpretation of the next two variables, the percentage of Pfandbriefe and
cover loans due the following year (PBDUE and CLDUE ), is quite similar. A higher
PBDUE may signal the need of short-term refinancing, a higher CLDUE the necessity
to provide additional cover assets. Hence, we expect both variables to be positively
related to the yield spread. Table 4.3 shows meaningful differences between the issuers.
On average, PBDUE and CLDUE amount to 15% to 20%, but may also be 0% or almost
100%. These variables, however, have to be used with care since maturity mismatches
can also be compensated by the use of derivatives or other bank assets and liabilities.
Pfandbriefe are mainly backed by German cover assets with median values of
89% for public and 98% for mortgage Pfandbriefe. However, the percentage of German
cover assets (GERM ) varies substantially between 8.5% and 100%. This variable can
have two opposite effects. On the one hand, GERM signals lower diversification and,
therefore, higher residual risk, which should lead to a higher risk premium. On the
other hand, German public-sector debt is considered relatively safe compared to other
European countries, and the German real estate market has shown less volatile and
less overvalued than real estate markets of other countries.21 Therefore, German cover
assets can be regarded as less risky leading to a lower yield spread. The empirical
analysis will provide evidence whether one of these effects is prevalent or whether the
impact even depends on the considered sample period.
SMALL and LARGE show the percentage of mortgage cover loan amounts below
EUR 300,000 and above EUR 5 million, respectively. Their values range between 0%
21For the last ten years, the IPD Total Return Property Index for Germany shows a substantially
lower annualized volatility of below 1% compared to values above 2% for most other countries (up to
5% for the United States).
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and 100%. A higher value of SMALL means that the cover pool is more granular and
hence, ceteris paribus, less risky. Therefore, we expect the yield spread being negatively
related to SMALL. Vice versa, we predict a positive relation for LARGE as a measure
for low diversification.
On average, Pfandbrief issuers finance residential and commercial mortgages
in equal shares. However, there are large differences between issuers, ranging from
complete residential financing to complete commercial financing. Since commercial
financing is usually more risky and shows a higher dependence on the business cycle,
a high fraction of commercial mortgages (COM ) – or, equivalently, a low fraction of
residential mortgages (RES ) – should lead to a risk premium for the corresponding
Pfandbriefe. Moreover, it is important to note that the variables RES and COM
are closely related to SMALL and LARGE as residential mortgages are typically
smaller and commercial mortgages often exceed EUR 5 million. Therefore, is is not
surprising that the variables are positively correlated, with ρ(SMALL,RES ) = 0.93
and ρ(LARGE ,COM ) = 0.89. To avoid the problem of multicollinearity, we do not
simultaneously include them into a regression.
We compute the quarterly yield spreads for each Pfandbrief as the average of the
weekly yield spreads during the six weeks following the record date. This period is the
usual time by which nearly all issuers have published their reports. The calculation of
the average yield spread during this period is considered as a trade-off between using
the yield spread precisely at the record date or using the yield spread after six weeks
when the information is actually available to all market participants. As the cover pool
composition for a single issuer remains relatively constant over time, this assumption
is not likely to distort our results. After the quarterly calculation, we remain with 972
outstanding Pfandbriefe with available price data and 4,678 quarterly yield spreads for
the time span from December 2005 to December 2008. Table 4.4 presents the summary
information for the quarterly data. The number of available issues drops due to the
modification of the time period. The composition of the data set in terms of Pfandbrief
segments and rating classes, however, does not change notably.
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Figure 4.1: Pfandbrief Yield Spreads relative to German Bunds
This figure shows the average yield spreads of the four Pfandbrief segments relative to the term
structure of German Bunds in basis points. The average yield spreads are calculated on a weekly basis
for the time period from January 2000 until January 2009.
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
We first investigate the yield spreads of the different Pfandbrief segments relative to
Bunds. Figure 4.1 shows the average yield spreads of the four segments on a weekly
basis. The vertical lines mark the beginning of the subprime crisis period, and the
post-Lehman period, respectively. In the pre-crisis period until June 2007, the average
Pfandbrief spread for all segments relative to Bunds is approximately 10 bp with a
maximum of up to 30 bp. Surprisingly, also periods with average Pfandbrief spreads
below zero exist, showing that Pfandbriefe sometimes even trade at a small yield
discount relative to Bunds. This result signals the very high quality of Pfandbriefe
perceived by investors.
With the advent of the subprime crisis the picture completely changes. Starting
in July 2007, the average yield spreads steadily rise to approximately 50 bp until
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Figure 4.2: Pfandbrief Yield Spreads relative to public Jumbo Pfandbriefe
This figure shows the average yield spreads of three Pfandbrief segments relative to the term structure
of public Jumbo Pfandbriefe in basis points. The average yield spreads are calculated on a weekly basis
for the time period from January 2000 until January 2009.
September 2008. Furthermore, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the spreads
drastically increase to approximately 120 bp for Jumbo Pfandbriefe and 150 bp
for traditional Pfandbriefe. These spreads signal the high risk premia demanded by
investors during the recent financial turmoil and suggest that, at least during financial
crises, Pfandbriefe cannot be regarded as close substitutes for Bunds in terms of risk.
Moreover, this figure clearly supports the partitioning of our sample in a pre-crisis
period and separate periods for the subprime and the post-Lehman financial crisis.
Comparing the Pfandbrief spreads with respect to Bunds, however, does not allow
to disentangle the different risk premia contained in the Pfandbrief market. Hence, it
is still questionable whether the strong increase in yield spreads is mainly driven by
liquidity or credit risk. For an in-depth analysis, we therefore compute the yield spreads
relative to public Jumbo Pfandbriefe. This approach enables us to better isolate the
individual risk premia by comparing Pfandbriefe that only differ in one dimension.
Figure 4.2 shows the average yield spreads of the remaining three Pfandbrief segments
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on a weekly basis and striking yield differences within the Pfandbrief market become
visible.
Similar to the yield spreads relative to Bunds, this figure also shows a different
behavior during the pre-crisis period, the subprime crisis, and the post-Lehman period.
In the pre-crisis period, the three average segment yield spreads mostly vary between
−5 bp and 10 bp. Whereas mortgage Jumbo Pfandbriefe trade relatively stable at a
yield spread of 2 bp on average, traditional Pfandbrief yield spreads are more volatile
and trade at a premium of 3–5 bp on average. With the beginning of the subprime
crisis, the average yield spreads increase to 10 bp for mortgage Jumbo Pfandbriefe
and 20 bp for traditional Pfandbriefe, rising up to 50 bp after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers.
For a detailed analysis, Table 4.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the individual
yield spreads relative to the average public Jumbo Pfandbrief yield curve for the total
sample and the different subperiods. In general, mortgage Jumbo Pfandbriefe trade at
a small premium and traditional Pfandbriefe at a larger premium relative to public
Jumbo Pfandbriefe. Hence, Pfandbriefe backed by mortgages seem to be considered as
more risky than those covered by public-sector loans. Moreover, the lower liquidity of
traditional Pfandbriefe is priced with 4–6 bp on average relative to Jumbo Pfandbriefe.
During the crisis subperiods the average yield spreads significantly increase up to 38
bp for public traditional Pfandbriefe. Even though a rise in the credit risk premium
for mortgage Jumbo Pfandbriefe can be observed, the effect on the liquidity premia for
traditional Pfandbriefe is substantially larger.
Within a specific Pfandbrief segment, however, the yield spreads also vary
considerably. During the pre-crisis and the subprime crisis period traditional Pfandbrief
spreads are much more volatile with an increasing volatility during the latter period. In
the post-Lehman period, yield spreads highly fluctuate within all Pfandbrief segments.
Even for public Jumbo Pfandbriefe the yield spreads vary between −48 bp and 192
bp. This observation shows that it is not sufficient to partition the Pfandbrief market
into the four segments to entirely explain the varying yield spreads. Hence, further risk
factors should be considered.
In summary, the results clearly show that the Pfandbrief market cannot be
regarded as homogenous and considerable differences between the Pfandbriefe segments
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Table 4.5: Descriptive Statistics for Pfandbrief Yield Spreads (Weekly Data)
This table shows the summary statistics for the Pfandbrief yield spreads relative to the
term structure of public Jumbo Pfandbriefe in basis points. The statistics are based on
the equally weighted yield spread observations in the respective Pfandbrief segment and
time period (winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles). N is the number of weekly
observations. The sample period ranges from January 2000 to January 2009 (Panel A) and
is partitioned into the pre-crisis period (January 2000 to June 2007, Panel B), the period
of the subprime crisis (July 2007 to September 2008, Panel C), and the post-Lehman
period (September 2008 to January 2009, Panel D).
Panel A: Total Sample
Pfandbrief Segment Mean
Std.
Min. Median Max. % > 0 N
Dev.
Public Jumbo Pfandbrief 0.0 7.2 -48.3 -0.2 191.5 46.3% 82,640
Mortgage Jumbo Pfandbrief 2.6 8.5 -41.3 1.3 120.6 68.6% 17,600
Public Traditional Pfandbrief 5.5 13.9 -61.9 5.4 187.5 77.0% 49,046
Mortgage Traditional Pfandbrief 6.3 11.3 -36.2 6.1 195.9 81.9% 32,701
Panel B: Pre-Crisis Period
Pfandbrief Segment Mean
Std.
Min. Median Max. % > 0 N
Dev.
Public Jumbo Pfandbrief 0.0 3.5 -9.4 -0.2 15.0 46.9% 72,546
Mortgage Jumbo Pfandbrief 2.1 4.5 -7.6 1.2 21.4 68.3% 13,932
Public Traditional Pfandbrief 2.9 9.9 -61.9 4.6 31.9 74.6% 40,725
Mortgage Traditional Pfandbrief 5.4 9.4 -33.1 5.9 63.0 81.7% 29,663
Panel C: Subprime Crisis
Pfandbrief Segment Mean
Std.
Min. Median Max. % > 0 N
Dev.
Public Jumbo Pfandbrief 0.0 4.9 -12.3 -0.4 22.4 45.6% 7,996
Mortgage Jumbo Pfandbrief 4.0 5.8 -7.0 2.7 22.6 77.1% 2,862
Public Traditional Pfandbrief 14.4 13.1 -30.0 14.0 48.1 89.9% 6,992
Mortgage Traditional Pfandbrief 11.6 13.8 -27.7 11.2 52.4 84.7% 2,527
Panel D: Post-Lehman Period
Pfandbrief Segment Mean
Std.
Min. Median Max. % > 0 N
Dev.
Public Jumbo Pfandbrief -0.1 39.4 -48.3 -11.0 191.5 27.4% 2,098
Mortgage Jumbo Pfandbrief 5.8 32.6 -41.3 -2.7 120.6 43.1% 806
Public Traditional Pfandbrief 38.2 39.4 -42.7 41.8 187.5 82.8% 1,329
Mortgage Traditional Pfandbrief 30.0 36.9 -36.2 26.9 195.9 79.3% 511
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as well as between individual Pfandbriefe exist. In the following, we explore the yield
spreads within the Pfandbrief market in detail and relate them to liquidity and credit
risk proxies.
4.4.2 Analysis of Pfandbrief Spreads
In this section we investigate the Pfandbrief yield spreads on a weekly basis. We aim
to assign the different components of the yield spreads to the explanatory variables
introduced in Section 4.3.2. Panel A of Table 4.6 displays seven regression results for
the pre-crisis period which all comprise segment dummies and differ by the inclusion
of Pfandbrief rating dummies (Regression B) and issuer rating dummies (Regression
C). Regressions D to G further include the Pfandbrief’s relative age and outstanding
amount as liquidity proxies as well as two dummies for Landesbank Pfandbriefe issued
before and after the abolishment of the guarantor liability on 18 July 2005.
The results show a significant and positive relation between the yield spreads and
the dummies for mortgage and traditional Pfandbriefe. Depending on the inclusion of
further explanatory variables, the average credit risk premium for mortgage Pfandbriefe
relative to public Pfandbriefe amounts to 2 bp and the average liquidity premium for
traditional Pfandbriefe relative to Jumbo Pfandbriefe adds up to 4 bp. The joint dummy
variable is always higher and approximately equals the sum of the credit risk and the
liquidity premium. Altogether, these segment variables already explain some part of
the variation in the yield spreads.
As expected, the Pfandbrief rating has a significant influence on the yield spread
and a higher rating leads to a lower spread. The differences are around 2 bp between
AA and AAA rated Pfandbriefe. Surprisingly, the absence of a Pfandbrief rating does
not unambiguously lead to a higher yield spread. This result, however, may be driven
by the fact that Pfandbriefe are usually not rated in the beginning of our sample
period and, thus, a rating does not signal a higher credit quality per se. Even though
the impact of the rating dummies is significant, they hardly explain any variation in
the yield spreads when omitting the segment dummies (not reported). In contrast, the
issuer rating may explain a meaningful part, increasing the adjusted R2 up to 10%. The
results are also economically significant as a Pfandbrief from a BBB/BB rated issuer
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on average trades at a premium of more than 4 bp compared to a AAA/AA rated
issuer. This result provides evidence that investors already value the long-term issuer
credit quality during the pre-crisis period when Pfandbriefe are typically considered as
close substitutes to Bunds.
The results also show a significant and positive relation between the yield
differences and the liquidity proxies. Besides the premium for traditional Pfandbriefe,
a higher relative age and a lower outstanding amount (both signaling a lower liquidity)
lead to a significantly higher yield spread. In particular, a Pfandbrief close to maturity
on average trades at an additional yield spread of 6 bp relative to its issuance. Hence,
liquidity seems to be an important priced risk factor even during the pre-crisis period.
Our results further show that the average yield spreads for Landesbank
Pfandbriefe significantly increase after the discontinuation of the guarantor liability.
Investors seem to attribute a risk premium of 3 bp to Pfandbriefe that are not
guaranteed by the federal states even though the underlying cover pools did not change
considerably. Overall, the full model (Regression G) explains roughly 14% of the yield
spread variation within the Pfandbrief market.
The results for the subprime crisis presented in Panel B of Table 4.6 are similar
in terms of sign and significance, but much more pronounced. The yield spreads are
higher in absolute terms and the adjusted R2 is up to 40%. It is important to note
that the credit risk premium between mortgage and public Pfandbriefe only increases
to 3–5 bp whereas the liquidity premium between traditional and Jumbo Pfandbriefe
considerably increases up to 14 bp. In contrast to the results in Panel A, the joint
effect is smaller than the sum of the credit risk and the liquidity premium, suggesting
a negative correlation between liquidity and credit risk. This result complements the
findings of Favero et al. (2010) for European sovereign bonds and Bu¨hler and Trapp
(2010) for high quality AAA rated corporate bonds that, in contrast to the findings
for sub-investment grade bonds, liquidity and credit risk interact negatively in high
quality bond markets.
Whereas the yield spread between AA and AAA rated Pfandbriefe is
approximately 4 bp, the yield spreads between the issuer rating categories are up
to 7 bp. Similar to the pre-crisis period, the issuer rating explains a higher fraction
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of the variation in the yield spreads. In addition, the Pfandbrief’s relative age and
its outstanding amount have a significant impact similar to the pre-crisis period, but
larger in absolute values. This result, in conjunction with the higher yield spreads for
traditional Pfandbriefe, provides evidence of a considerably higher liquidity premium
during the subprime crisis.
In contrast to the results during the pre-crisis period, Landesbank Pfandbriefe are
penalized with significant yield spreads of up to 4 bp. This result can be rationalized
by the fact that nearly all Landesbanks were engaged in unsuccessful investments in
the subprime market. Hence, investors also appear to value the risk stemming from
non-Pfandbrief businesses. As expected, the yield spread is significantly higher for
Pfandbriefe issued after the abolishment of the guarantor liability.
The results substantially change during the period after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. While the explanatory variables explain a large part of the yield spread in
the previous regressions, Panel C of Table 4.6 shows that the Pfandbrief segments are
able to exclusively explain only 16%. The major part can be proxied by the issuer
rating dummies, the liquidity proxies and firm-specific effects leading to an adjusted
R2 of 50% for the full model. However, there are still significant differences between the
Pfandbrief segments, most notably between traditional and Jumbo Pfandbriefe. The
average yield spread between these segments is up to 45 bp and shows the particular
relevance of liquidity in the post-Lehman era. Moreover, yield spreads between low and
high rated Pfandbriefe as well as low and high rated issuers increase considerably. The
average yield spread of a BBB rated issuer compared to an AA rated issuer exceeds 22
bp and is larger than the impact of the Pfandbrief rating or whether the Pfandbrief is
covered by mortgage or public-sector loans. This result strongly indicates that investors
consider the issuers’ default risk even though Pfandbriefe are backed by high-quality
cover assets.
Besides the striking yield difference between traditional and Jumbo Pfandbriefe,
the relative age has a strong impact of up to 25 bp between recently issued and almost
matured Pfandbriefe. Hence, liquidity seems to be the most important factor considered
by Pfandbrief investors. However, the Pfandbrief yield spreads are also driven by various
issuer fixed effects during this periods. In contrast to the previous results, Landesbank
Pfandbriefe trade at a yield discount of up to 17 bp compared to other Pfandbriefe
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– irrespective whether the Pfandbrief is issued before or after the discontinuation of
the guarantor liability. This result signals that, against the background of the financial
crisis, investors expect the owners or the state to rescue Landesbanks even though
a legal guarantee does not apply any more. Apparently, the evident problems of the
private banks DEPFA and Hypo Real Estate are priced by investors with yield spreads
of approximately 96 bp and 50 bp, respectively. Hence, investors do not completely
anticipate the rescue of these issuers in case of default. However, it is important to
note that the problems of these issuers did not arise in the cover pool assets, but are
due to non-Pfandbrief business. Therefore, our investigation provides further evidence
that investors evaluate the default risk of an issuer to a large extent, even though the
cover pools remain reliable.
In summary, our results show that the Pfandbrief market exhibits considerable
heterogeneity, and the risks perceived by investors strongly vary over time. During
the pre-crisis and the subprime crisis period, the four Pfandbrief segments account for
a large part of the Pfandbrief yield spreads whereas the issuer rating does not play
an important role. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, however, the issuer rating
and issuer-specific factors become more important. Moreover, it is surprising that the
specific cover pool quality, proxied by mortgage versus public-sector loans as well as
the Pfandbrief rating, seems to be only a subordinate factor beyond liquidity and issuer
default risk. Therefore, it seems sensible that rating agencies nowadays consider the
issuer quality as an additional factor for their rating methodology. Above all, liquidity
appears to be the most important risk factor priced in the secondary Pfandbrief market.
4.4.3 Detailed Analysis Using Cover Pool Data
Up to this point, we only approximate the cover pool quality by the distinction between
mortgage and public-sector cover loans and the Pfandbrief rating. In the following,
we explicitly consider proxies for the quality of the cover pool using the information
according to § 28 Pfandbrief Act presented in Section 4.3.3.
Cover pool information is available on a quarterly basis only. In order to ensure
consistency, we initially compare the basic results for weekly and quarterly yield spread
data. The summary statistics and the regression results for the quarterly data are shown
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in the appendix of this chapter. Table C.1 reports the descriptive statistics for the
individual Pfandbrief yield spreads relative to public Jumbo Pfandbriefe on a quarterly
basis. The results are very similar to those using weekly data and being presented
in Table 4.5: Mortgage Jumbo Pfandbriefe trade at a small premium and traditional
Pfandbriefe at a larger premium. The premia substantially increase during the financial
crisis. Even though the number of observations is much smaller, the regression results
do not change considerably when using quarterly data. Table C.2 shows that the sign of
the coefficient estimates mostly coincide and the magnitude is quite similar compared
to the results displayed in Table 4.6. Hence, the interpretation of the results does
not change compared to the results for weekly data presented in Section 4.4.2. This
robustness check shows the consistency of the samples with weekly and quarterly data.
Therefore, we proceed with quarterly data to analyze the impact of the cover pool
variables.
The regression results presented in Tables 4.6 and C.2 have shown that the model
including the Pfandbrief segments, the issuer rating, and the liquidity proxies is superior
in explaining the individual Pfandbrief yield spreads. Therefore, we use this model as
the basic model when measuring the impact of the cover pool variables. In contrast to
the previous regressions, however, we refrain from using the Pfandbrief rating dummies
since we aim to measure the quality of the cover pool directly by using the cover pool
variables defined above. Table 4.7 displays the regression results for the pre-crisis period
(Panel A), the subprime crisis (Panel B) and the post-Lehman financial crisis (Panel
C). Regression A shows the basic model and Regression B to G include the six cover
pool variables defined in Section 4.3.3 separately. Regression H provides the coefficient
estimates for the cover pool variables only, and Regression I presents the results for
the full model.
During the pre-crisis period, only the impact of the overcollateralization OC is
significant when including the cover pool variables separately. As expected, a higher
OC leads to a lower yield spread. The impact, however, is economically small given
that an OC of 100% may decrease the yield spread by only 0.22 bp. Considering the six
cover pool variables alone, the adjusted R2 amounts to roughly 3% signaling that only
a very small part of the Pfandbrief yield spreads can be explained by the cover pool
variables. Estimating the full model, however, leads to superior results. Even though
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the cover pool variables only account for a small rise of the adjusted R2, three of them
have a significant impact. First, the OC is significant negative as in Regression B.
Second, a higher fraction of German cover assets leads to a higher yield spread. Thus,
Pfandbrief investors seem to price the lower regional diversification within the cover
pools. Third, Pfandbriefe with a more granular portfolio trade at a significant yield
discount, signaling the higher value of Pfandbriefe with a diversified underlying cover
pool.22
It is important to note that the sign and significance of the basic model variables
do not change when including the cover pool variables. Comparing these results to Panel
A of Table C.2, we provide evidence that, during the pre-crisis period, the Pfandbrief
yield spreads are mainly driven by the differences between the four Pfandbrief segments
and their relative liquidity. The additional impact of the issuer rating and the quality
of the cover pool is of minor importance.
The results only slightly change during the period of the subprime crisis. Whereas
the four Pfandbrief segments and the liquidity proxies already explain 42% of the
variation in the yield spreads, the full model only marginally improves the adjusted
R2 by 1%. During the subprime crisis, however, the variable measuring the term
transformation, |TRANS |, has a significant impact on the yield spreads. A maturity-
mismatch of the cover assets and the outstanding Pfandbriefe by one year accounts
for 1 bp of the yield spread. Moreover, a higher fraction of Pfandbriefe due within
the following year, PBDUE , is significantly related to a higher yield spread. These
results indicate that, during the period of the subprime crisis, investors are concerned
about the term transformation of the Pfandbrief issuer. Moreover, as during the pre-
crisis period, Pfandbriefe with a more granular portfolio trade at a significant yield
discount. However, the Pfandbrief segment variables and the liquidity variables remain
the primary drivers of the yield spread.
The picture completely changes when investigating the post-Lehman period.
Panel C of Table C.2 has already shown that the issuer’s long term credit rating
is an important driver of the yield spread beyond the Pfandbrief segment and the
22Instead of SMALL, we separately include LARGE , RES , and COM into the regression analysis.
The results, however, do not change remarkably, and the interpretation remains identical.
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liquidity variables. In addition, Panel C of Table 4.7 provides evidence that Pfandbrief
investors also evaluate the cover pool quality in detail. When considering the six cover
pool variables separately, four of them are significantly related to the yield spread. As
during the subprime period, the term transformation, |TRANS |, is positively related to
the yield spread with an impact of 6 bp for each year of maturity-mismatch. A higher
amount of cover loans due within the following year, CLDUE , is also positively related
to the yield spread at a 10% significance level. This is consistent with investors being
concerned about the capability of the issuer to provide additional cover assets of at
least the same quality.
In contrast to the results for the pre-crisis period, the fraction of German
cover pool assets, GERM , has a significant negative impact. This result suggests
that investors prefer the high quality and lower volatility of German cover assets
to international diversification of the cover pool during times of financial turmoils.
Moreover, a more granular cover pool as measured with SMALL and, equivalently, a
higher fraction of residential mortgages have a significantly negative impact on the
yield spread. Thus, Pfandbrief investors prefer cover pools that are less volatile and
less dependent on the contemporaneous economic conditions.
Considering the full model, Regression I shows that the cover pool variables
additionally account for almost 4% of the adjusted R2 compared to the basic model
(Regression A). It is surprising that the cover pool variables even explain a larger
part of the Pfandbrief yield spread than the consideration of the Pfandbrief rating
as in Regression G in Panel C of Table C.2. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the
overcollateralization OC does not have a significant impact during the period of the
subprime crisis and the post-Lehman period. Moreover, the impact is economically very
small in the pre-crisis period. Hence, investors do not seem to take into account the
amount of OC when pricing a Pfandbrief. On the one hand, this result may show that
the legal requirement of a minimal OC is sufficient and any additional OC does not
have any impact. On the other hand, OC can be regarded as less relevant since the
number frequently may change by the issuance of new Pfandbriefe. Overall, our results
show that the general composition of the cover pool is more important than simply the
amount of overcollateralization.
Altogether, the results for the post-Lehman financial crisis provide evidence that
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liquidity is the most important risk factor for pricing Pfandbriefe. Whereas it is less
relevant whether the Pfandbrief is backed by public-sector or mortgage loans, the
composition of the cover pool gains more importance. The issuer rating as well as
firm-specific effects remain relevant.
4.5 Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter we extensively study credit risk and liquidity premia within the
Pfandbrief market. In contrast to previous studies, we show that liquidity is not the
exclusive driver of yield spreads between Pfandbriefe and German government bonds
and issuer-specific effects as well as the cover pool quality is also relevant. Therefore,
our results show that the presumption of a homogenous Pfandbrief market cannot be
sustained any longer.
Pfandbriefe differ with respect to their type of collateral, the quality of the issuer,
the quality of the cover pool, and their liquidity. In general, yield spreads between
individual Pfandbriefe are mainly driven by their relative liquidity and whether they
are covered by public-sector or mortgage loans. Even though the recent financial crisis
has its origin in the mortgage market, the type of cover assets appears to be less
important during this period. Liquidity, however, proves to have the most important
effect.
Strict legal requirements ensure the high quality of the Pfandbrief cover pool and
aim to guarantee the Pfandbrief holder timely payments of the Pfandbrief obligations.
However, the general quality of the Pfandbrief issuer still has an important impact,
in particular during the financial crisis. This result shows that Pfandbrief investors
are concerned about an issuer’s default and the potential subsequent illiquidity or
devaluation of a Pfandbrief. Hence, it is not surprising that nowadays all major rating
agencies consider the issuer rating as an important factor for their Pfandbrief rating
methodology.
In general, the impact of the cover pool quality is quite small. Hence, our results
provide evidence that the strict regulation of German Pfandbriefe ensures the overall
high quality of the cover pool. During the recent financial crisis, however, some variables
like the term transformation between Pfandbriefe and their cover pool or the fraction
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of German cover assets show a significant impact on the yield spreads. Therefore, the
mandatory publications according to § 28 Pfandbrief Act seem to be less important
during normal market times, but provide additional value in times of financial turmoil.
During these periods, Pfandbrief issuers with a sustainable cover pool may profit from
relatively lower refinancing cost.
Altogether, the Pfandbrief market has shown to develop from a relatively
homogenous market until the end of the nineties to a heterogenous market with
issuer-specific and liquidity related risk premia. The understanding of the different risk
premia within the Pfandbrief market is important for investors, issuers, and regulators.
Investors are mainly interested in accurately knowing about the risks inherent in the
Pfandbrief market during different market environments. Issuers need to know the
perceived risk factors priced by investors to design an optimal Pfandbrief issuance.
As the Pfandbrief market is systemic for the German banking system, regulators are
concerned about the issuers’ long-term ability to meet their Pfandbrief obligations.
Moreover, regulators from other countries should be informed about the important
risk factors when setting up a legal framework for covered bonds.
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C Appendix to Chapter 4
Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics for Yield Spreads (Quarterly Data)
This table shows the summary statistics for the Pfandbrief yield spreads relative to the
term structure of public Jumbo Pfandbriefe in basis points. The statistics are based on
the equally weighted yield spread observations in the respective Pfandbrief segment and
time period (winsorized at the 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles on a weekly basis). N is
the number of quarterly observations. The sample period ranges from January 2006 to
January 2009 (Panel A) and is partitioned into the pre-crisis period (January 2006 to
June 2007, Panel B), the period of the subprime crisis (July 2007 to September 2008,
Panel C), and the post-Lehman period (September 2008 to January 2009, Panel D).
Panel A: Total Sample
Pfandbrief Segment Mean
Std.
Min. Median Max. % > 0 N
Dev.
Public Jumbo Pfandbrief -0.3 14.1 -43.3 -0.9 157.2 37.9% 1,662
Mortgage Jumbo Pfandbrief 2.3 13.1 -26.8 0.9 100.1 60.1% 546
Public Traditional Pfandbrief 13.9 21.1 -36.8 9.9 166.7 81.2% 1,737
Mortgage Traditional Pfandbrief 11.6 18.1 -29.9 9.0 128.1 79.1% 733
Panel B: Pre-Crisis Period
Pfandbrief Segment Mean
Std.
Min. Median Max. % > 0 N
Dev.
Public Jumbo Pfandbrief -0.5 3.5 -8.1 -0.8 12.0 36.5% 822
Mortgage Jumbo Pfandbrief 0.8 3.4 -6.5 0.4 18.2 57.5% 261
Public Traditional Pfandbrief 3.5 9.5 -29.2 4.5 24.1 69.2% 737
Mortgage Traditional Pfandbrief 6.0 8.9 -19.8 6.6 29.5 74.5% 380
Panel C: Subprime Crisis
Pfandbrief Segment Mean
Std.
Min. Median Max. % > 0 N
Dev.
Public Jumbo Pfandbrief -0.3 4.2 -10.5 -0.5 19.9 43.8% 630
Mortgage Jumbo Pfandbrief 2.8 4.5 -6.1 2.1 19.3 73.4% 207
Public Traditional Pfandbrief 15.3 12.1 -23.4 15.8 43.9 91.6% 761
Mortgage Traditional Pfandbrief 12.0 13.3 -23.9 12.1 47.7 85.5% 255
Panel D: Post-Lehman Period
Pfandbrief Segment Mean
Std.
Min. Median Max. % > 0 N
Dev.
Public Jumbo Pfandbrief 0.5 38.5 -43.3 -13.0 157.2 25.7% 210
Mortgage Jumbo Pfandbrief 6.3 33.1 -26.8 -5.3 100.1 33.3% 78
Public Traditional Pfandbrief 41.3 37.7 -36.8 47.1 166.7 84.9% 239
Mortgage Traditional Pfandbrief 32.1 34.1 -29.9 34.8 128.1 80.6% 98
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